We present a simple model implying that futures risk premia depend on both ownmarket and cross-market hedging pressures. Empirical evidence from 20 futures markets, divided into four groups~financial, agricultural, mineral, and currency! indicates that, after controlling for systematic risk, both the futures own hedging pressure and cross-hedging pressures from within the group significantly affect futures returns. These effects remain significant after controlling for a measure of price pressure. Finally, we show that hedging pressure also contains explanatory power for returns on the underlying asset, as predicted by the model.

Risk perceptions of individual investors are studied by asking experimental questions to 2,226 members of a consumer panel. Their responses are analyzed in order to find which risk measures they implicitly use. We find that most investors implicitly use more than one risk measure. For those investors who systematically perceive risk according to the same risk measure, semi-variance of returns is most popular. Semi-variance is similar to variance, but only negative deviations fro the mean or another benchmark are taken into account. Stock investors implicitly choose for semi-variance as a risk measure, while bond investors favor probability of loss. Investors state that they consider the original investment to be the most important benchmark, followed by the risk-free rate of return, and the market return. However, their choices in the experimental questionnaire study reveal that the market return is the most important benchmark

The question of why individual investors want dividends is investigated by submitting a questionnaire to a Dutch investor panel. The respondents indicate that they want dividends partly because the cost of cashing in dividends is lower than the cost of selling shares. Their answers provide strong confirmation for the signaling theories of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985). They are inconsistent with the uncertainty resolution theory of Gordon (1961Gordon ( , 1962 and the agency theories of Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984). The behavioral finance theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) is not confirmed for cash dividends but is confirmed for stock dividends. Finally, our results indicate that individual investors do not tend to consume a large part of their dividends. This raises some doubt as to whether a reduction or elimination of dividend taxes will stimulate the economy.JEL classification: G30; G35; G38

Abstract:We study wealth effects for a sample of 156 spin-offs from 15 different European countries that were announced between January 1987 and September 2000. The cumulative average abnormal return over the three-day event window is 2.62%. This number increases to 2.66% for the subsequently completed spin-offs. The cumulative average abnormal return is 3.57% for completed spin-offs by companies that increase their industrial focus and only 0.76% for non-focus increasing companies. The difference between these two sub-samples is significantly different from zero. These results are in line with previous studies for the United States. The long-run returns in excess of matching firms are mostly insignificant for parents, subsidiaries and pro-forma combined firms. This result suggests that, unlike U.S. spin-offs, European spin-offs are not associated with long-run superior performance.

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