The role of rehearsal and generation in false memory creation

Abstract

The current research investigated one possible mechanism underlying false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In the DRM paradigm, participants who study lists of related words (e.g., "table, sitting, bench ...") frequently report detailed memories for the centrally related but non-presented critical lure (e.g., "chair"). One possibility is that participants covertly call to mind the critical non-presented lure during the study phase, and later misattribute memory for this internally generated event to its external presentation. To investigate this, the DRM paradigm was modified to allow collection of on-line thoughts during the study phase. False recognition increased following generation during study. False recognition also increased following study of longer lists; this effect was partially explained by the fact that longer lists were more likely to elicit generations of the critical lure during study. Generation of the lure during study contributes to later false recognition, although it does not explain the entire effect.

Incidental versus intentional encoding in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm: Does amnesic patients' implicit false memory depend on conscious activation of the lure?

“…In order to obtain explicit false memory, on the other hand, conscious lure activation is not a prerequisite (see Gallo, 2006), but it does increase the effect obtained. Several studies, asking participants to think aloud (or to write down their thoughts), have found that verbalization of the critical lure is associated with an increased likelihood of false recall and/or false recognition (Goodwin et al, 2001;Marsh & Bower, 2004;Seamon et al, 2002). Therefore, also in the present experiment, effects of verbalization on both implicit and explicit memory measures were to be expected.…”

Imagery encoding effects on memory in the DRM paradigm: A test of competing predictions

“…However, neither the use of source tests nor acts of generating guarantee reductions in false memory rates in the DRM paradigm. As we mentioned earlier in this paper, Marsh and Bower (2004) reported that asking participants to describe what comes to mind during encoding-a form of generating-subsequently led to an inflation of the false memory effect. Along similar lines, within the context of the DRM procedure, Hicks and Marsh (2001) reported that the overall levels of errors on critical lures were higher for a source-test condition compared to a standard recognition test condition.…”

“…Seamon, Philbin, & Harrison, 2006). Furthermore, using the DRM paradigm, Marsh and Bower (2004) showed that simply asking participants to describe what came to mind during encoding-a form of generating-subsequently led to an increase in false memory rates. From this perspective, explicitly asking participants to generate and describe their images may lead to an increase in false memory rates.…”

“…Foley & Foy, in press) or more deliberate activations (e.g. Foley et al, 2006;Marsh & Bower, 2004). When encountering these implicit thoughts as test items, to avoid committing false memory errors, participants must correctly monitor their source, remembering that the items were only experienced in thought (Foley et al, 2006;Johnson et al, 1993).…”

Imagery encoding and false recognition errors: Examining the role of imagery process and imagery content on source misattributions

“…Along similar lines, Marsh and Bower (2004) reported that simply asking participants to describe what came to mind during encoding*a form of generating*may actually inflate false memory rates. Interestingly, when participants generate images of themselves interacting with objects presented in thematic lists, false memory rates in the DRM task are reduced relative to a control condition involving reading (Gunter, Bodner, & Azad, 2007) but the relative false memory rate (approximately 51%, Gunter et al, 2007, Experiment 3) is considerably higher than that observed when participants describe the details guiding their own imagery generations (Experiments 1Á2; approximately 20%, Foley et al, 2006, Experiment 2).…”