The Role of Middle Power–NGO Coalitions in Global Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban

Bolton, Matthew; Nash, Thomas

doi:10.1111/j.1758-5899.2009.00015.x

Cited by 42 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 19 publications

(16 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In this area, scholars have argued that norms have powerfully shaped states' decisions to produce, use, or agree to limit chemical weapons (Price 1997), biological weapons (Cole 1998), cluster munitions (Bolton and Nash 2010), landmines (Cottrell 2009;Price 1998), and a multiplicity of other "unconventional" weapons. In this area, scholars have argued that norms have powerfully shaped states' decisions to produce, use, or agree to limit chemical weapons (Price 1997), biological weapons (Cole 1998), cluster munitions (Bolton and Nash 2010), landmines (Cottrell 2009;Price 1998), and a multiplicity of other "unconventional" weapons.…”

Section: Nuclear Norms and The Logic Of Appropriatenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

2013

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

H ow strong are normative prohibitions on state behavior? We examine this question by analyzing anti-nuclear norms, sometimes called the "nuclear taboo," using an original survey experiment to evaluate American attitudes regarding nuclear use. We find that the public has only a weak aversion to using nuclear weapons and that this aversion has few characteristics of an "unthinkable" behavior or taboo. Instead, public attitudes about whether to use nuclear weapons are driven largely by consequentialist considerations of military utility. Americans' willingness to use nuclear weapons increases dramatically when nuclear weapons provide advantages over conventional weapons in destroying critical targets. Americans who oppose the use of nuclear weapons seem to do so primarily for fear of setting a negative precedent that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by other states against the United States or its allies in the future.

show abstract

Section: Nuclear Norms and The Logic Of Appropriatenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

2013

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A similar process, led by Norway, culminated in the signing of the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008 (Bolton and Nash 2010). These new treaties created regime complexes governing certain types of conventional weapons, in which the primary institutional body-the CCW-had standards that conflicted with those of the more comprehensive land mine and cluster munitions conventions.…”

Section: Contested Multilateralism On Conventional Weapons Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In recent years, WIPO has attempted to regain control of this issue area and to convince OECD countries that it is the right forum for intellectual property regulations (May and Sell 2006). WIPO has been somewhat successful at reestablishing itself as the primary venue for negotiating intellectual property treaties (May 2010), as the stalled WTO negotiations no longer offer a viable alternative forum for developed countries.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Contested multilateralism

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

"Contested multilateralism" describes the situation that results from the pursuit of strategies by states, multilateral organizations, and non-state actors to use multilateral institutions, existing or newly created, to challenge the rules, practices, or missions of existing multilateral institutions. It occurs when coalitions dissatisfied with existing institutions combine threats of exit, voice, and the creation of alternative institutions to pursue policies and practices different from those of existing institutions. Contested multilateralism takes two principal forms: regime shifting and competitive regime creation. It can be observed across issue areas. It shapes patterns of international cooperation and discord on key security concerns such as combating terrorist financing, halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and banning certain conventional weapons. It is also evident on economic issues involving intellectual property, on environmental and energy issues, and in the realm of global public health. The sources of dissatisfaction are primarily exogenous, and the institutions used to challenge the status quo range from traditional treaties or intergovernmental organizations to informal networks, some of which include non-state actors. Some institutions are winners from the process of contested multilateralism; others may lose authority or status. Although we do not propose an explanatory theory of contested multilateralism, we do suggest that this concept provides a useful framework for understanding changes in regime complexes and the strategies that generate such changes.

show abstract

“…Within the field of munitions response, much of the impetus to deal with abandoned, discarded or unexploded munitions has generally come from the global campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions, rather than local political mobilization (Bolton, 2010;Bolton & Nash, 2010;Rutherford, 2011). In fact, under civil society pressure the U.K. government began demining the Falklands/Malvinas Islands despite local leaders actively requesting the money be used for other purposes (Gillan, 2005).…”

Section: The Political Process Of Risk Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is part of a broader research effort examining the politics of controlling and managing the risk of explosive remnants of war and conventional weapons (Bolton, 2008(Bolton, , 2010Bolton & Nash, 2010;Bolton, Sakamoto, & Griffiths, submitted for publication). This is part of a broader research effort examining the politics of controlling and managing the risk of explosive remnants of war and conventional weapons (Bolton, 2008(Bolton, , 2010Bolton & Nash, 2010;Bolton, Sakamoto, & Griffiths, submitted for publication).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technocratic Responses to the Politicization of Risk: Underwater Munitions in New York City’s Gravesend Bay and Narrows

Bolton¹

2012

mar technol soc j

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Risk and its management are social phenomena, constructed through dynamic political, cultural, and economic systems. Those wishing to publicize and manage the risk posed by legacy underwater munitions would benefit from an awareness of the political context in which they work. The interaction of various local, national, and global political interests will enable certain kinds of risk management action while also constraining others. This article examines such issues through a case study of politics of underwater munitions in New York City’s Gravesend Bay and Narrows. The impetus to deal with these munitions has largely come from their politicization by local civilians: politicians, environmental activists, lawyers, and journalists. By contrast, risk management actions by national-level military institutions have consistently functioned to depoliticize the issue by framing it technocratically. This illustrates a common political tension in risk management. Public mobilization raises awareness of risk but may sensationalize it. Technocrats have the budgetary and technical wherewithal to deal with it professionally but resist politicization of risk and try to channel and defuse mobilization through existing institutions and programs.

show abstract

The Role of Middle Power–NGO Coalitions in Global Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban

Cited by 42 publications

References 19 publications

Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

Contested multilateralism

Technocratic Responses to the Politicization of Risk: Underwater Munitions in New York City’s Gravesend Bay and Narrows

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About