Contested multilateralism

Abstract

"Contested multilateralism" describes the situation that results from the pursuit of strategies by states, multilateral organizations, and non-state actors to use multilateral institutions, existing or newly created, to challenge the rules, practices, or missions of existing multilateral institutions. It occurs when coalitions dissatisfied with existing institutions combine threats of exit, voice, and the creation of alternative institutions to pursue policies and practices different from those of existing institutions. Contested multilateralism takes two principal forms: regime shifting and competitive regime creation. It can be observed across issue areas. It shapes patterns of international cooperation and discord on key security concerns such as combating terrorist financing, halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and banning certain conventional weapons. It is also evident on economic issues involving intellectual property, on environmental and energy issues, and in the realm of global public health. The sources of dissatisfaction are primarily exogenous, and the institutions used to challenge the status quo range from traditional treaties or intergovernmental organizations to informal networks, some of which include non-state actors. Some institutions are winners from the process of contested multilateralism; others may lose authority or status. Although we do not propose an explanatory theory of contested multilateralism, we do suggest that this concept provides a useful framework for understanding changes in regime complexes and the strategies that generate such changes.

China engages with the global intellectual property governance: The recent trend

“…Second, China fumbled its way to navigate the international IP regime complexity. Different from the US strategy of forum‐shifting and new forum creation (Morse & Keohane, ), China tends to play a multi‐fora game, which is more nuanced and refined than either one‐way assimilation to the US‐centered liberal order or a collision course with this order. This observation is consistent with observations from international financial regulation where “ China is not seeking to demolish or exit from current international organizations and multilateral regimes.…”

Crisis, Compromise and Institutional Leadership in Global Trade: Unfair Trade, Sustainable Trade, and Durability of the Liberal Trading Order

“…However, the research agenda downplays conflicts, be it political or legal. It is an extension of regime concept, rebranded as the 'regime complex' approach or 'contested multilateralism' (Orsini et al, 2013;Keohane and Morse 2015;Morse and Keohane 2014;Meunier and Morin 2015). Yet, liberal institutionalists fail to specify precisely how conflicts between legal subsystems are mitigated within this network of institutional subsystems.…”

Regime complexity and global governance: The case of trafficking in persons

“…In addition, they can move negotiations and law-making activities from one venue to another so as to reshape the legal landscape and alter the constellation of actors involved in the process of decision-making -a strategy typically referred to as "regime shifting" (Helfer, 2004(Helfer, , 2009. Regime shifting also allows states and non-state actors to create "counter-regime norms," or contradictory rules in a parallel regime, with the aim of challenging the established normative framework (Alter and Meunier, 2009;Morse and Keohane, 2014). In addition, states can exploit the rule ambiguity and legal fragmentation in some regime complexes to engage in a selective interpretation and implementation of their commitments (Helfer, 2009;Gehring and Faude, 2013).…”