The role of institutional shareholders as owners and directors and the financial distress likelihood. Evidence from a concentrated ownership context

Lizano, Montserrat Manzaneque; Merino, Elena; Priego, Alba María

doi:10.1016/j.emj.2016.01.007

Cited by 44 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014) and Fuente et al (2017) document that pressure-resistant directors are associated with quality reporting. Manzaneque et al (2016) show that these directors are related to lower financial distress. García Osma and Gill-de-Albornoz Noguer (2007) reveal that board independence is associated with less earnings management while Dowell et al (2011) shows that the likelihood of surviving financial distress increases with independent directors.…”

Section: Bank Power-board Independence Effects On Financial Distress mentioning

confidence: 92%

“…In contrast pressure-resistant blockholders only have investment interest in the firm and are therefore unconstrained in their monitoring (Bhattacharya and Graham, 2009). Cornett et al (2007) and Manzaneque et al (2016) show, respectively, that pressure-resistant blockholders enhance firm performance and reduce financial distress, while Bhattacharya and Graham, 2009 document that pressure-sensitive blockholders have the opposite effect.…”

Section: Bank Power-block Ownership Effects On Financial Distress Likmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bank power, block ownership, boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

Mangena

Priego

Lizano

2020

Journal of Corporate Finance

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Section: Bank Power-board Independence Effects On Financial Distress mentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Bank Power-block Ownership Effects On Financial Distress Likmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bank power, block ownership, boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

Mangena

Priego

Lizano

2020

Journal of Corporate Finance

Self Cite

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“…Indeed, Spanish boards of listed firms are characterised as having, on average, a 40% proportion of institutional directors, the highest percentage among European countries (Heidrick and Struggles, 2011). Large banks are some of the most sig- Manzaneque, Merino, and Priego (2016), who find that the percentage of pressure-resistant directors on Spanish boards of listed firms is higher than that of pressure-sensitive directors.…”

Section: Institutional Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Female directorship on boards and corporate sustainability policies: Their effect on sustainable development

Pucheta‐Martínez

Olcina‐Sempere

López‐Zamora

2019

Sustainable Development

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We aim to explore whether board gender diversity—specifically, women directors representing institutional ownership—improves the sustainability development of listed firms by affecting corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies. Moreover, among female directors representing institutional shareholders, we can differentiate between those working for banks and insurance companies (pressure‐sensitive female institutional directors) and those working for mutual funds, investment funds, pension funds, and venture capital firms (pressure‐resistant female institutional directors). The effect of these categories of directors on CSR policies is also analysed. Our evidence suggests that women directors representing institutional ownership positively affect CSR policies, which is the same as for pressure‐resistant female institutional directors, and pressure‐sensitive institutional directors do not impact CSR policies. This research provides a new framework for the role played by certain types of female directors (female institutional directors, female pressure‐sensitive directors, and female pressure‐resistant directors) in relation to CSR policies, and thus, it may help policymakers to promote CSR policies and to take action to promote responsible behaviour among listed firms.

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“…board structure − how large or small the board would be and how independent it would be, and its impact on performance (Bohdanowicz, 2015;Lefort and Urzua, 2008;Manzaneque, Merino and Priego, 2016). For example, institutional owners may insist on directorships when the firm is important to them or otherwise when they perceive they are capable of preventing a firm from failing, particularly in the context of concentrated ownership (Manzaneque, Merino and Priego, 2016).…”

Section: Power Of Concentrated Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Tobin's Q as a Measure of Organizational Performance

Singh

Tabassum

Darwish

et al. 2017

British J of Management

210

153

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This empirical study examines the relationship between corporate governance and organizational performance (OP), measured using Tobin's Q (TQ) in the context of an emerging economy for which, as yet, only a handful of studies have been conducted. We employ a system generalized method of moments approach controlling for endogeneity and test it on a newly created dataset comprising 324 listed firms in Pakistan. We find that board size, number of board committees and ownership concentration are positively linked with high TQ ratio, whilst board independence and CEO duality display a negative relationship. In terms of moderating effects, we find that ownership concentration negatively moderates the relationship between board independence and OP, as well as that of CEO duality and OP. The relationship between the number of board committees and OP is positively moderated by ownership concentration. Our findings contribute towards a better articulation and application of a more concrete measure of OP − that of the TQ ratio − whilst, at the same time, testing the board composition-performance relationship in the context of an upcoming and increasingly important emerging market. Wider applicability of results and policy implications are discussed.

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The role of institutional shareholders as owners and directors and the financial distress likelihood. Evidence from a concentrated ownership context

Cited by 44 publications

References 59 publications

Bank power, block ownership, boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

Bank power, block ownership, boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

Female directorship on boards and corporate sustainability policies: Their effect on sustainable development

Corporate Governance and Tobin's Q as a Measure of Organizational Performance

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