2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101636
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Bank power, block ownership, boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

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Cited by 32 publications
(57 citation statements)
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References 100 publications
(296 reference statements)
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“…An alternative measure of bankruptcy risk is financial distress, defined as the ability of the firm to meet its financial obligations (Mangena et al , 2020). Adopting the approach developed by Pindado et al (2008), financial distress is an ex ante measure based on two conditions.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An alternative measure of bankruptcy risk is financial distress, defined as the ability of the firm to meet its financial obligations (Mangena et al , 2020). Adopting the approach developed by Pindado et al (2008), financial distress is an ex ante measure based on two conditions.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consistent with the approach used by recent studies (Pindado et al, 2008;Manzaneque et al, 2016b;Mangena et al, 2020), the measurement for financial distress (FD) was calculated as a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the company meets the following conditions and 0 if not: (1) its earnings before interest and taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are lower than its financial expenses for two consecutive years; (2) a fall in its market value occurs between two consecutive periods 1 . This ex-ante approach is especially advantageous since it allows overcoming problems of the ex-post business failure approaches by considering crisis situations other than bankruptcy (Grice and Dugan, 2001).…”
Section: Dependent Variable: Financial Distressmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and corporations, usually have a greater stake in individual firms, thus increasing their incentives to monitor the top management through an active board chair (e.g., Connelly et al, 2017; Tihanyi et al, 2003). Chairs appointed by the largest shareholders can also bring detrimental effects to firms through their influence over management decisions, as Mangena, Priego, and Manzaneque (2020) reported.…”
Section: Agenda For Future Research On the Role Of The Board Chairmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chairs appointed by the largest shareholders can also bring detrimental effects to firms through their influence over management decisions, as Mangena, Priego, and Manzaneque (2020) reported.…”
Section: Ownership Mattersmentioning
confidence: 99%