The Rise of the BRICS and American primacy

Abstract

participants at the APSA panel.Abstract The importance of rising powers has become an increasingly remarked upon phenomenon in international politics. The BRICS (Brazil Russia, India, China and South Africa) and others represent an increasing presence in economic, security, political and even cultural terms, while the relative weight of Europe and Japan, traditional centers of power, has appeared to recede. Scholars and political observers have tended to assess these changes as heralding a new era in which the BRICS not only become far more influential in world affairs, but also respond by reshaping, sustaining and promoting international institutions and regimes in an increasingly multipolar world. However, are the BRICS increasingly acting as stakeholders or is the international order becoming more multipolar without becoming more multilateral? In practice, across a wide range of issue areas the BRICS have more often been free riders, less rather than more cooperative in maintaining or enhancing international institutions and international order. In these circumstances, the international engagement of the United States as the world's principal provider of public goods remains vital for global order. The material underpinnings for this role are still viable and even robust, but the determinants of whether it can or will continue to do so are as much ideational, in terms of policy, leadership and political will, as they are material. The American role has included creating and sustaining international institutions, supporting regional stability, security and nonproliferation, underpinning the global economy, and encouraging human rights and democratization. Consequently, a combination of American retrenchment and BRICS abdication would be likely to result in a weakening not only of multilateral institutions but of these elements of international order as well.

Αμερικανικός Ηγεμονισμός Και Ανάδυση Νέων Περιφερειακών Δυνάμεων: Ανακατατάξεις Στο Σύγχρονο Διεθνές Σύστημα;

“…Παράλληλα, όμως, τα τελευταία χρόνια άρχισαν να αναδύονται νέες περιφερειακές δυνάμεις που ίσως μελλοντικά να ανταγωνι-στούν σε ισχύ τον έναν παγκόσμιο ηγεμόνα και να μεταβάλουν το χαρακτήρα του διεθνούς συστήματος (Beeson και Bisley, 2013/ Lieber, 2014.…”

What prospects for common humanity in a divided world? The scope for RtoP in a transitional international order

“…As a result, a major debate in international relations has explored whether the liberal international order is coming to an end (Buzan and Cox, 2013;Singh, 2008;Ikenberry, 2011;Kupchan, 2012). It is much less clear if the rising powers are able or wish to collectively support a coherent alternative normative worldview (Lieber, 2014;Laïdi, 2012) that democratic states constitute a legitimate community for the purposes of coercive humanitarian action -even without Security Council authorization -reinforces this sense of normative dissonance (Geis, 2013). In this context a range of controversies remain in terms of the definition, scope and application of RtoP, and many of these naturally relate to reacting to atrocities.…”

How you stand depends on how we see: International capital mobility as social fact

“…The other main scenario, one of co-optation, pictures a gradual adaptation and integration of China into the liberal world order. Such a scenario is mostly found in liberal (institutionalist) approaches, in which opportunities for the US and the West to accommodate China's economic rise within the liberal order are emphasized (Ikenberry, 2008(Ikenberry, , 2009(Ikenberry, , 2014Lieber, 2014;Steinfeld, 2010). In global trade, China's WTO membership accordingly constituted a cornerstone of integration into the liberal order, and as previous research has pointed out, China is most of the time acting as a pragmatic WTO rule-taker (Zeng & Liang, 2013; but see Weinhardt and ten Brink in this Forum).…”