How you stand depends on how we see: International capital mobility as social fact

Chwieroth, Jeffrey M.; Sinclair, Timothy J.

doi:10.1080/09692290.2012.675875

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 90 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For work on the connection between economic knowledge and preferences in these policy domains, see Bearce and Tuxhorn 2017;Prather 2015;and Tomz 2004;but compare Curtis, Jupille, and Leblang 2014. 46. See, for example, Chwieroth and Sinclair 2013;and Drezner and McNamara 2013. from paying sufficient attention to the role of prevailing ideas. Much can be gained by entering into dialogue with constructivists, and by incorporating the study of causal beliefs into our accounts of economic preferences.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?

Rho¹,

Tomz²

2017

Int Org

244

195

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The dominant approach to the study of international political economy assumes that the policy preferences of individuals and groups reflect economic self-interest. Recent research has called this assumption into question by suggesting that voters do not have economically self-interested preferences about trade policy. We investigate one potential explanation for this puzzling finding: economic ignorance. We show that most voters do not understand the economic consequences of protectionism. We then use experiments to study how voters would respond if they had more information about how trade barriers affect the distribution of income. We find that distributional cues generate two opposing effects: they make people more likely to express self-serving policy preferences, but they also make people more sensitive to the interests of others. In our study both reactions were evident, but selfish responses outweighed altruistic ones. Thus, if people knew more about the distributional effects of trade, the correlation between personal interests and policy preferences would tighten. By showing how the explanatory power of economic self-interest depends on beliefs about causality, this research provides a foundation for more realistic, behaviorally informed theories of international political economy.Over the past two decades, open-economy politics (OEP) has emerged as the dominant paradigm in the field of international political economy. Scholars working in this tradition reason "from the most micro-to the most macro-level." 1 They use economic theory to derive the policy preferences of individuals and groups within a country, and then investigate how political institutions and international bargaining translate preferences into actual policies. Initially developed to explain trade policy, OEP has been extended to many other issues, including international monetary policy, capital controls, foreign investment, foreign aid, and immigration. 2 Today OEP is recognized as the principal approach to international political economy in the United States, and it has transformed scholarship in other parts of the world as well. 3 We are grateful for helpful comments from many colleagues, including

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?

Rho¹,

Tomz²

2017

Int Org

244

195

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…71 Woll (2008). For a different account of how firms and regulators understand their interests that challenges and complements our own in different ways, see Chwieroth and Sinclair (2013). struggling to build and reshape international forums in order to influence exit options.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…25 We note, however, that by the same token our framework pays short shrift to other accounts of structural power. For example,Chwieroth and Sinclair (2013) argue that capital mobility may be powerful because it is a "social fact" rather than because it reflects the actual exit opportunities available to firms. As shared social beliefs about capital mobility drift away from actual exit opportunities, our arguments will become correspondingly less useful.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Structuring power: business and authority beyond the nation state

Farrell

Newman²

2015

Bus. polit.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What is the relationship between globalization and the political power of business? Much of the existing literature focuses on the ability of mobile capital to threaten exit in order to press for more business friendly rules. In this article, we refine arguments about exit options in global markets by arguing that the relative exit options available to business and other actors are neither fixed, nor exogenous consequences of some generically conceived process of globalization. Instead, they themselves are the result of struggles between actors with different interests and political opportunities. Since exit options play a crucial role in determining the relative structural power of business vis-à-vis other actors, we dub the power to shape exit optionsstructuring power, distinguishing it from structural power, and argue that it is crucial to explaining it. We identify two channels through which actors can shape exit options – extending jurisdictional reach and reshaping the rules of other jurisdictions – and the factors that will make regulators and business more or less capable of exercising structuring power. We then use two exploratory case studies – one involving privacy regulation, the other accountancy standards – to illustrate how structuring power can work to shape exit options, and thus structural power. We conclude by considering the relationship between structuring power, structural power, and the existing literature in comparative and international political economy.

show abstract

“…Indeed, it is often read retrospectively to explain aspects of the institutional design of the post-war Bretton Woods international economic order. Policy actors work with the assumption that the theoretical claim in question describes economic reality, and consequentially that their actions need to take account of that social fact (Chwieroth and Sinclair 2013;Widmaier 2004). The so-called 'Nixon shock' of 1971 when the US suspended the convertibility of the dollar to gold (thereby ending the Bretton Woods regime) is a prime example of 'impossible trinity' logic at work.…”

Section: Economic Ideas and The Policy Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performing Theory/Theorizing Performance in Emergent Supranational Governance: The ‘Live’ Knowledge Archive of European Integration and the Early European Commission

Rosamond

2015

Journal of European Integration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article considers the entanglement of theories of international politics and international economics on the one hand and an emergent supranational policy actor on the other. The formation of the European Communities in the late 1950s and early 1960s is well known as a moment of radical supranational institutional creation. This is a period in which both economists and political scientists sought to theorize the processes of regional integration as it was happening. The article shows that the newly-formed European Commission, in both its communicative and coordinative discourse, drew selectively on the 'live' knowledge archive of both international economics and international relations to generate a strategic narrative about what European economic integration entailed, how it would be accomplished and (crucially) what kind of actor it was. At the same time, the semi-inductive quality of academic knowledge production meant that the Commission's activities were simultaneously being theorized into the live archive from which it was drawing. The paper examines the influence of two bodies of theory: one from economics (Balassa's theory of international economic integration), and the other from political science (neofunctionalism). The former is a striking influence on early discussions, initiated by the Commission, on monetary union, but its finger prints are rather more enduring -being visible in Commission communicative discourse well into the 1970s.

show abstract

How you stand depends on how we see: International capital mobility as social fact

Cited by 14 publications

References 90 publications

Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?

Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?

Structuring power: business and authority beyond the nation state

Performing Theory/Theorizing Performance in Emergent Supranational Governance: The ‘Live’ Knowledge Archive of European Integration and the Early European Commission

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About