The Rise of Corporatist Regulation in the English and Canadian Dairy Industries

Abstract

This article answers Larry Gerber's (1995) challenge for a renewed appreciation of the social science literature on corporatism and state theory by explaining variations in corporatist institutions through the concept of policy legacies. To understand the variation in corporatist forms of governance, three policy areas are key: the long-standing trade policies of the England and Canada, the forms of government intervention during World War I, and prior political battles within the dairy industries. In their own unique way, these policies shaped the character of the market failure, the political capacities of farm organizations, and the institutional response that incorporated private interest groups within the formulation and implementation of public policy. By viewing the emergence of corporatist institutions in England and Canada as examples of governmental responses to economic crisis, this research on corporatism contributes to the larger theory of the determinants, as well as the effects, of the state in capitalist democracies.

The Emergence of Agricultural Marketing Boards Revisited: A Case Study in Canada

“…Both constituencies were dominated by the development of a highly concentrated fluid milk processing industry and characterized by verbal agreements between producers and purchasers. It is mentioned in the literature that temporal specificity of milk exacerbated partners' interdependence: “ Not only were there no alternative outlets for farmers' perishable product, but powerful wholesalers controlled the fluid markets of the cities ” (Barnes 2001, p. 385). Also, the slow development of large‐scale butter and cheese manufacturing due to imports limited producers' exit options (Barnes 2001, p. 385).…”

“…It is mentioned in the literature that temporal specificity of milk exacerbated partners' interdependence: “ Not only were there no alternative outlets for farmers' perishable product, but powerful wholesalers controlled the fluid markets of the cities ” (Barnes 2001, p. 385). Also, the slow development of large‐scale butter and cheese manufacturing due to imports limited producers' exit options (Barnes 2001, p. 385). Most marketing boards were implemented in Great Britain in the postwar period.…”