The Rise of Conservative Interest Group Litigation

O'Connor, Karen; Epstein, Lee

doi:10.2307/2130136

Cited by 52 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Some think that the period is quite long. Accordingly, they examine counter-mobilization in terms of decades-long equilibrating processes in the lobbying activities and influence of such macro-level interests as business and social movements or liberal secularists and the religious right (Layman, 2001;McFarland, 1991;O'Connor and Epstein, 1983;Salisbury, 1969, pp. 1-8).…”

Section: Expectations About Counter-mobilizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reconsidering The Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: Health Policy Lobbying In The American States

Lowery¹,

Gray

Wolak

et al. 2005

Polit Behav

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Despite its widespread use since the concept was introduced by David Truman (1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf), counter-mobilization by organized interests has remained theoretically ambiguous and rarely studied empirically. We more fully develop the concept of short-term counter-mobilization, distinguish it from long-term counter-mobilization, specify the conditions under which we might observe short-term counter-mobilization, and test the resulting hypotheses with data on health care lobby registrations in the American states during the late 1990s. We find little evidence of short-term counter-mobilization among health interest organizations, which leads us to more fully consider several null hypotheses about the limits of strategic behavior on the part of organized interests.

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Section: Expectations About Counter-mobilizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reconsidering The Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: Health Policy Lobbying In The American States

Lowery¹,

Gray

Wolak

et al. 2005

Polit Behav

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“…12;J. Surprisingly, there is more systematic evidence of the influence of organized interests on the judicial process (Caldeira and Wright 1988;O'Connor and Epstein 1983;Puro 1971 Surprisingly, there is more systematic evidence of the influence of organized interests on the judicial process (Caldeira and Wright 1988;O'Connor and Epstein 1983;Puro 1971 …”

Section: Measuring Constituent and Personal Ideologymentioning

confidence: 98%

A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations

Segal¹,

Cameron²,

Cover³

1992

American Journal of Political Science

153

109

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.We test a spatial model of Supreme Court confirmation votes that examines the effects of (1) the ideological distance between senators' constituents and nominees, (2) the personal ideologies of senators, (3) the qualifications of the nominee, (4) the strength of the president, and (5) the mobilization for and against nominees by interest groups. The data consist of the 1,475 individual confirmation votes from the 1955 nomination of John Harlan until the 1987-88 nomination of Anthony Kennedy (voice votes excluded). All of the above factors significantly affect confirmation voting. The model explains 78% of the variance in senators' decisions, predicts 92% of the individual votes correctly, and predicts all of the aggregate outcomes correctly. IntroductionThis paper examines a spatial model of roll call voting on Supreme Court nominations from John Harlan (1955) to Anthony Kennedy (1988). We approach roll call voting from much the same perspective as proponents of the new institutionalism who have adapted the spatial theory of voting to the roll call setting (Krehbiel and Rivers 1988). We explain below why we believe this approach is particularly promising. But we address the questions raised in recent roll call studies and the literature on representation in legislatures more broadly by considering the impact of constituent desires, interest group pressures, presidential power, and the personal ideologies of legislators on roll call votes. We focus on voting on Supreme Court nominees, which supplies a tractable setting for examining these questions. The model builds on our previous work (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990), in which constituency ideology is measured inferentially using scores developed by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Our new model represents an This content downloaded from 128.255.6.125 on Mon, 20 Jun 2016 15:21:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms A SPATIAL MODEL OF ROLL CALL VOTING 97effort to measure constituency influence more directly and to purge the ADA scores of senators' personal ideologies. In this model selected state-level presidential election results are used to measure constituency ideology. We then add an explicit measure of the effect of senators' personal ideologies in addition to the purified constituency measure of the previous model. This model further extends our original work by offering a more complete specification of how the president affects the confirmation process and by incorporating interest group activity into the model as a factor that influences senators' votes. Ideology, Constituents, and Roll Call VotingWithout slighting other approaches, we start our examination of roll call voting with those studies t...

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“…Interest groups can set the agenda for courts and influence legal change. Evidence exists that interest groups through the use of court briefs have influenced judicial decision making (Caldeira and Wright 1988;O'Connor and Epstein 1983). Thus, the strength of teachers unions should lead to a lower probability of court ordered reform.…”

Section: Law and The Legal Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

State Policy Innovation in Perspective

Roch

Howard

2008

Political Research Quarterly

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Why and when courts will change policy has been the subject of significant scholarly attention, but there has been little effort to integrate this research within the existing research of determinants of state legislative policy change. In this article, the authors incorporate both of these research areas to answer the question of whether policy change will occur through the legislature or through the courts, examining the important issue of education finance reform. To understand and predict this change, the authors characterize the state policy environment as consisting of political, legal, and strategic factors. The authors find that a combination of political and strategic factors influences legislatures and the courts, but that law matters greatly to the courts, particularly state constitutional education clauses. The authors also find that institutional structure influences the degree to which politics matters to the courts.

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The Rise of Conservative Interest Group Litigation

Cited by 52 publications

References 5 publications

Reconsidering The Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: Health Policy Lobbying In The American States

Reconsidering The Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: Health Policy Lobbying In The American States

A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations

State Policy Innovation in Perspective

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