Reconsidering The Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: Health Policy Lobbying In The American States

Abstract

Despite its widespread use since the concept was introduced by David Truman (1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf), counter-mobilization by organized interests has remained theoretically ambiguous and rarely studied empirically. We more fully develop the concept of short-term counter-mobilization, distinguish it from long-term counter-mobilization, specify the conditions under which we might observe short-term counter-mobilization, and test the resulting hypotheses with data on health care lobby registrations in the American states during the late 1990s. We find little evidence of short-term counter-mobilization among health interest organizations, which leads us to more fully consider several null hypotheses about the limits of strategic behavior on the part of organized interests.

Evaluation models and evaluation use

“…Such a view conceives of information as a commodity in political struggles, with both a price and a value (Hall and Deardorff, 2006), and thus posits that it should be offered to allies and used strategically against opponents. This observation is supported by strong empirical data about the way lobbyists and organizations exchange information, the structure of communication networks between them and how the convergence of preferences and interests influences the communication process (Heaney, 2006;Heinz et al, 1993;Lowery et al, 2005;Smith, 1995;Wright, 1990).…”

Buffalo tales: interest group policy stories in Greater Yellowstone

“…Informed by the literature (Lowery et al 2005), the 168 BFC documents were content analyzed by independent coders for type of lobby tactics: conventional (e.g., testifying at a public hearing, asking the public to contact an elected official) or unconventional (e.g., protest activities, parades). To address the possibility that BFC may have reported on a lobby activity that did not materialize, we cross-validated all lobbying activities and found all but one such proposed activity was later reported as having occurred; the one unverified activity was thus dropped from the analysis.…”

Congressional and Presidential Effects on the Demand for Lobbying

“…Changes in the economy or in society more generally would thus result in increases in the numbers of interest groups, since more groups would be needed to address issues arising from these changes. Although the underlying collective action problems and differential abilities to organize identified by Olson (1965) means that this response to disturbances will not apply equally to all groups, some subsequent research has found support for the idea that interest groups mobilize more easily when their interests are threatened (Hansen 1985, Walker 1991; but for a contrary finding see Lowery et al 2005).…”