Congressional and Presidential Effects on the Demand for Lobbying

Abstract

The authors show that the number of lobbyists active in a given issue area is driven not only by social mobilizations and economic trends but also by government activity. The effect of government spending is smaller than that of congressional interest as reflected in the number of hearings. Much lobbying is in response to regulations, not budgets. The authors augment their analysis by considering indicators of presidential activities. In areas where the president is traditionally active, presidential activity is shown to divert lobbying away from Congress, reducing overall lobbying levels. The authors find strong support for the congressional demand model of lobbying.

Lobbying and congressional bill advancement

“…Consistent with evidence that government agendas in particular issue areas drive lobbying activity (Leech et al, 2005;Baumgartner et al, 2011), legislative advancement may also stimulate lobbying on particular bills. If a general increase in bill introductions on a particular topic drives additional lobbying Lowery et al, 2005), interest groups may be more motivated to participate or increase their level of involvement when bills make their way through Congress.…”

“…Congressional hearings related to the issue areas of concern to interest groups also stimulate their mobilization, even at the state level . Lobbyists are more active in issue areas associated with more government spending and more congressional hearings, but the relationship with hearings is stronger because lobbying is often directed at potential regulations (Baumgartner et al, 2011). All of these analyses find that total lobbying by issue area is relatively stable, however, with most organizations lobbying the same amount on the same general concerns each year (Leech et al, 2005;Baumgartner et al, , 2011.…”

“…The lobbying agenda does not reflect the media or public agenda; it is concentrated in areas of health and the environment, for example, and less common in crime and the economy . Interest groups lobby more on issues where government is actively regulating and spending (Baumgartner et al, 2011). On the basis of data from a sample of issues referenced on lobbying disclosure forms, the most popular issue areas generate a large share of lobbying; the budget and appropriations area tops the list (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001).…”

Comparing Populations of Interest Organizations: Skating on Thin Ice?

“…That is, in a number of recent projects, scholars innovatively link the agenda scheme to other schemes (Baumgartner et al 20115, Berkhout et al 2013, Leech et al 2005. The linking of classification schemes allows for the examination of explanatory factors from multiple 'contexts' in which interest groups operate without having to force all contexts into a single scheme.…”

The Supply of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Market for Information at the U.S. Supreme Court

“…It thus appears that indicators of the Court's demand for information drive the supply 2 Hansford (2011) examines aggregate patterns in the filing of amicus briefs but does so only in the context of testing whether organized interests on one ideological "side" appear to respond to the filings of their opponents. 3 For example, Leech et al (2005) and Baumgartner et al (2011) examine aggregate levels of organized interest activity in Washington, D.C., but only for very short time spans. As Gray et al (2005) note, this research design allows for substantial variation across issues but not across time.…”