Lobbying and congressional bill advancement

Grossmann, Matt; Pyle, Kurt

doi:10.1057/iga.2012.18

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 30 publications

(36 reference statements)

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“…However, members are frequently asked by colleagues, constituents, and interest groups to take positions on legislation outside of their area of expertise, before it is considered in committee, or sometimes before it is even introduced. We argue that one of the ways they are able to do so is by relying on endorsements from interest groups, which serve as informative signals for members with limited time and resources early on, just as their committee testimony and lobbying efforts do in later stages of the legislative process (Arnold ; Grossmann and Pyle ; Hall and Deardorff ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Christenson

Craig

2018

American J Political Sci

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Why do some pieces of legislation move forward while others languish? We address this fundamental question by examining the role of interest groups in Congress, specifically the effect of their legislative endorsements in Dear Colleague letters. These letters provide insights into the information that members use to both influence and make policy decisions. We demonstrate that endorsements from particularly well-connected interest groups are a strong cue for members with limited information early in the legislative process and help grow the list of bill cosponsors. As bills progress, such groups have less direct weight, while legislation supported by a larger number of organizations and a larger number of cosponsors is more likely to pass. Thus, we illuminate the usage of Dear Colleague letters in Congress, demonstrate how members use interest groups in the legislative process, and shed new light on the varying impact of groups on public policy.

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confidence: 99%

Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Christenson

Craig

2018

American J Political Sci

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“…Testing these predictions requires observing the behavior of lobbyists and legislators on individual bills. This paper joins a small, but growing literature that measures interest group activity at the bill-level using transaction reports (Grasse and Heidbreder, 2011;Grossmann and Pyle, 2013;Lewis, 2013). Transaction reports have become widely available at the national level since the implementation of the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act; however, only a small minority of states require bill-level disclosure, and even fewer mandate reporting of the lobbying client's position on the bill.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest group lobbying and partisan polarization in the United States: 1999–2016

Garlick

2021

PSRM

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Abstact The lobbying activity of interest groups has been overlooked as a contributing factor to legislative party polarization in the United States. Using bill-level data from Congress and three state legislatures, I show floor votes on bills lobbied by more non-profit interest groups are more polarized by party. The state legislative data demonstrate the robustness of the relationship between lobbying and polarization, showing it is not an artifact of party agenda control, salience, or bill content. Increased lobbying from these groups in recent years helps explain high levels of partisan polarization in Congress and an uneven pattern across the state legislatures.

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“…In another paper, [20] looks at the difference between bills that were lobbied ex post and those lobbied before they were passed. Finally, in [11] the authors look at the determinants of interest group lobbying on particular bills after the bills have been passed, and identifies the areas where lobbying focusing on the implementation (rather than the formation) of legislation is more likely.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As mentioned earlier, one of the limitations of using the OpenSecrects.org data is that it only labels the bills that were lobbied, making the implicit assumption that all unlabelled bills were not lobbied. As explained above, in the US, lobbying 10 https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=108&t=3 11 See for example [4]. activities are required to be disclosed, violations of which can lead to severe penalties.…”

Section: Application To Unlabelled Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Which bills are lobbied? Predicting and interpreting lobbying activity in the US

Slobozhan¹,

Ormosi²,

Sharma³

2020

Preprint

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Using lobbying data from OpenSecrets.org, we offer several experiments applying machine learning techniques to predict if a piece of legislation (US bill) has been subjected to lobbying activities or not. We also investigate the influence of the intensity of the lobbying activity on how discernible a lobbied bill is from one that was not subject to lobbying. We compare the performance of a number of different models (logistic regression, random forest, CNN and LSTM) and text embedding representations (BOW, TF-IDF, GloVe, Law2Vec). We report results of above 0.85% ROC AUC scores, and 78% accuracy. Model performance significantly improves (95% ROC AUC, and 88% accuracy) when bills with higher lobbying intensity are looked at. We also propose a method that could be used for unlabelled data. Through this we show that there is a considerably large number of previously unlabelled US bills where our predictions suggest that some lobbying activity took place. We believe our method could potentially contribute to the enforcement of the US Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) by indicating the bills that were likely to have been affected by lobbying but were not filed as such.

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Lobbying and congressional bill advancement

Cited by 17 publications

References 30 publications

Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Interest group lobbying and partisan polarization in the United States: 1999–2016

Which bills are lobbied? Predicting and interpreting lobbying activity in the US

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