Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Abstract

Why do some pieces of legislation move forward while others languish? We address this fundamental question by examining the role of interest groups in Congress, specifically the effect of their legislative endorsements in Dear Colleague letters. These letters provide insights into the information that members use to both influence and make policy decisions. We demonstrate that endorsements from particularly well-connected interest groups are a strong cue for members with limited information early in the legislative process and help grow the list of bill cosponsors. As bills progress, such groups have less direct weight, while legislation supported by a larger number of organizations and a larger number of cosponsors is more likely to pass. Thus, we illuminate the usage of Dear Colleague letters in Congress, demonstrate how members use interest groups in the legislative process, and shed new light on the varying impact of groups on public policy.

The Role of Connections in Congressional Lawmaking

“…Legislative connections play a key role during the initial stages since a bill is drafted until it is considered at the committee stage. The findings are consistent with Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Craig (2019), who argue that the support of a select number of influential lawmakers is key for bills to advance the initial lawmaking stages. The decrease in the number of bills that become law is especially large (a 27% drop) for substantive and significant bills, which are landmark bills that received an end-of-the-year write-up in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.…”

“…One potential factor that might explain why the value of connections has increased over time is that lawmakers have less time and resources to read the bills that are introduced in Congress. As a result of ever-increasing fundraising demands-either to secure reelection facing tough challenger competition or to bid for party leadership and committee positions (Heberlig, 2003)-and a decrease in the number of professional staff in the House of Representatives, 26 lawmakers have less time for policy analysis and increasingly rely on interest groups, committee reports, and cues from colleagues and party leadership to decide which bills they should endorse and support (Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Craig, 2019). In this environment, the success of a bill might increasingly hinge on the endorsement and support of influential connections at the expense of the content and intrinsic value of the policy proposal.…”

Making (and Sometimes Taking) a Difference: The Dynamic Career of Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier

“…For example, in a piece in the American Political Science Review, Jan and her coauthors use the position of interest groups in the amici network as a measure of power, finding that groups influence judicial decision making when an equal number of briefs have been filed on both sides of a case (Box-Steffensmeier et al 2013). In a paper in the AJPS, they turn their attention from the Judiciary to Congress, finding that Dear Colleague letters from more central interest groups serve as valuable cues to members of Congress and encourage the co-sponsorship of bills early in the legislative process (Box-Steffensmeier et al 2019). At the same time, while providing these substantive insights, Jan and colleagues have developed innovative methods for modeling network data, proposing a model and R packagethe frailty exponential random graph model (FERGM)-for handling unobserved heterogeneity (Box-Steffensmeier et al 2017).…”

Why are some parliamentarians’ bills more likely to progress? Sponsorship as a signal

“…The model we put forward unifies different literatures linking (co)sponsorship with outcomes of the legislative process (e.g. Adler and Wilkerson, 2005; Borghetto and Pellegata, 2013; Box-Steffensmeier et al, 2019; Browne, 1985; Krutz, 2005; Wilson and Young, 1997). By conceiving sponsorship as an intra-legislative signal (Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996), we argue that risk-averse legislators retrieve information about the potential consequences of the bills by looking at the names of the authors.…”