The Rise of a Chinese House Church: The Organizational Weapon

Abstract

This article investigates the similarities between the organizational innovation of one underground Protestant house church in China and the rise of early communist parties. Much like the spread of communism, the organizational tactics of the church are designed to protect it in a hostile political environment. The different levels are insulated from each other, with limited knowledge of the members above and below. In this way, if anyone is raided by the authorities, the others can continue to function with little interruption. Thus, the highly touted “organizational weapon” developed by the Bolsheviks and recycled, for example, by the Chinese Communist Party in their struggle for power, has resurfaced many years later. However, this time it has been adopted by a religious “vanguard.”

Global Chinese Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity

“…Religious communities operating outside of the five official faiths and statesponsored patriotic associations, including many Pentecostal and charismatic churches, have no legal protections and engage in activities that are generally considered illegal by the state.11 As illegal organizations operating in an authoritarian political context, Pentecostal and charismatic churches tend to exist in a religious "black and gray market," where many hold services in private, access to worship services is by word of mouth and personal networks, and churches change location regularly to avoid detection (Yang 2006;Goossaert and Palmer 2011;Koesel 2013). While not all pentecostalized churches adopt clandestine measures to avoid the state, the fact that these churches are unregistered and illegal religious organizations means they are nevertheless susceptible to government pressures and operate in a context of perpetual uncertainty.…”

“…First and most importantly, these churches make up a sizable portion of unregistered house churches. Some of the largest pentecostalized churches reach well over one million members and have extensive networks (Koesel 2013;Liu 2009;Oblau 2005;Kindopp 2004;.12 While it is impossible to know the exact 10 Official Protestantism has no denominational affiliation in China, and Catholicism is considered independent from the Vatican. On the history and conflict of the Catholic Church in China, see especially Madsen 2004;Wiest 2004;Leung 1992.…”

Navigating Uncertainty: The Survival Strategies of Religious NGOs in China

“…Furthermore, some interviewees estimated a clergy to congregation ratio of 1:8000, an impossible ratio for a pastor to lead. That coupled with the decentralization of house churches (Koesel, 2013), whereby a single church cannot have more than 50 people and a pastor cannot oversee too many sites given travel distances leaves little wonder that the 1990s is deemed as the high point of house churches turning into cults. Therefore, the government's promotion of sound Christian higher education becomes synonymous with maintaining stability, preventing the birth of cults, 9 containing and controlling negative Western influences, and creating 'good citizens'.…”

The Political Economy of Religious Revival

“… 7. Some religious groups in China, such as house churches, have been able to grow without bureaucratic permissions. However, as unregistered organizations these churches are susceptible to considerable pressures and some have taken elaborate measures to survive; see, Wright and Zimmerman-Liu (2013) and Koesel (2013); more generally on unregistered Christians in China, see, Bays (2012) and Vala and O'Brien (2007). …”