The Rise and Fall of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Lessons for the European Union

Matthews, Duncan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2161764

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The negative vote on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) proved the willingness of the EP to assert its ambitions vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council. Matthews (2012) noted that one of the reasons for the EP to withdraw its consent was the need to exercise its new veto power; it also was concerned with the transparency of negotiations. The growing influence of the EP, as well as its capacity to exert control over all stages of decision-making, has the potential to develop into a more stringent relationship where the EP would be able to (informally) delegate tasks to the Commission -converting it into a (informal) principal.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon

Servent¹

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament (EP) can give or withdraw its consent to most international agreements. This new scenario calls for theoretical models that help us to better understand the roles and strategies of European Union (EU) institutions in international negotiations. Departing from 'two-level-games' and principal -agent models, this article examines three interrelated elements (levels of negotiations; decision-making stages; and strategies) to explain the first international negotiations under the consent procedure (SWIFT Agreement). This case shows how the EP made use of day-to-day decision-making to informally expand its formal veto powers. The EP is now capable of controlling the EU negotiator during both the agenda-setting and the negotiation stages. Its informal involvement is set to transform its relationship with the Council and their collective capacity to influence and control the Commission.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon

Servent¹

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…There are various well-documented cases of political conflict about international trade and investment agreements that reach back more than thirty years. Examples include the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1980s and early 1990s (Ayres 1998), the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the Millennium Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the late 1990s (Kobrin 1998;Bayne 2000), and the Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA) in the 2000s (Matthews and Žikovská 2013;Dür and Mateo 2014). However, broad scholarly debates about the politicization of such agreements did not emerge until the past decade.…”

Section: Sources and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Contestation about International Economic Agreements: Lessons for the Canada-UK Trade Relationship after Brexit

Hurrelmann¹,

Atikcan²,

Chalmers³

et al. 2018

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“…However, both of them encountered resistance in the US by various forms of online activism, including suspended access to websites like Wikipedia, blackouts of some website content, as well as mobilization efforts (Powell, ). Because the ISP liability was also an important issue in ACTA negotiations, ACTA was criticized for non‐transparency and became a focus of the rising global civil society and attracted unprecedented public concern (Dür & Mateo, ; Losey, ; Matthews & Žikovská, ; Sell, ; Yu, ). Eventually, the EU Parliament rejected ACTA.…”

Section: Responsive Engagement: China's Response To the Us‐led Plurilmentioning

confidence: 99%

China engages with the global intellectual property governance: The recent trend

Cheng

2019

World Intellectual Property

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As China becomes the second largest economy in the world, there have been increasing domestic demands requesting China to engage with the global governance of various issues more closely. In intellectual property (IP), China has recently engaged with global IP governance both responsively and actively. This paper answer the questions (a) how did China respond to the global IP up‐ratchet which sets higher IP standards; and (b) how did China actively promote its agenda for the global IP governance. This paper argues that China has a clearer and more consistent position in its responsive engagement than in active engagement. In other words, China is more affirmative in making defensive coalitions opposing TRIPS‐plus standards proposed by developed countries than promoting its own IP initiatives regionally or plurilaterally. China's positions in these defensive coalitions are the classic pro‐development, developing country positions. Its active IP engagement is more diversified. Specifically, China keeps a low profile and does not attempt to take the lead in IP negotiations at the Regional Compressive Economic Partnership. By contrast, China has emerged as a model exporter, focusing on IP capacity building in its IP arrangements in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and BRICS.

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The Rise and Fall of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Lessons for the European Union

Cited by 14 publications

References 2 publications

The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon

The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon

Political Contestation about International Economic Agreements: Lessons for the Canada-UK Trade Relationship after Brexit

China engages with the global intellectual property governance: The recent trend

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