The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb

South African Rollback: Revisiting Monitoring and Verification Lessons after 20 Years

“…Some reports indicate, however, that newer weapons (beginning in 1987, with the third weapon) utilized a targetable "glide" design. 26 South African scientists had also reportedly conducted significant research on more advanced weapons, including "boosted" devices that would have yields of around 100 kilotons, implosion designs, and delivery by ballistic missiles. According to Armscor officials, they had planned to replace the seven gun-design weapons with upgraded weapons, deliverable by aircraft or possibly ballistic missiles by the year 2000.…”

“…He also ordered that the Y-Plant be shut down by February 1, 1990. 34 Based on the steering committee's recommendations, the de Klerk government began dismantling its nuclear weapons program on February 26,1990, disassembling and destroying its nuclear weapons, destroying technical documents, and decontaminating its facilities. 35 Throughout this process, South Africa essentially carried out a unilateral disarmament of its nuclear weapons program with IAEA verification only taking place once the dismantlement process had been completed.…”

South Africa's Iran policy: ‘Poster child’ meets renegade

“…de Klerk became the President of South Africa in 1989, he ordered the dismantlement of the country's nuclear programme and nuclear devices, which was accomplished between July 1990 and July 1991. 15 When de Klerk informed the parliament about the nuclear programme in 1993, 16 six nuclear devices had been dismantled, much of the documentation destroyed, and laboratories converted or shut down. 17 South Africa opened all its facilities for inspection to the IAEA and provided complete information about its nuclear past.…”

Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation

“…Moreover, in his discussion of the Australian case for instance, Hymans admits that in some cases non-proliferation attitudes and commitments may become entrenched in state institutions, making the mere arrival in power of a new leader insufficient to turn policy around. Clearly, more analysis is needed not only of proliferation decisions themselves, but also of the institutional settings with which leaders must deal (Liberman 2001;Walsh 2001;Hymans 2008). …”