The Representational Effects of Communal Property: Evidence from Peru’s Indigenous Groups

Abstract

Why do some indigenous groups achieve coethnic political representation while others do not? In this paper, I highlight the primary role of communal property in shaping indigenous representation. While scholars often laud the developmental benefits of communal land titling, I argue that formalizing collectively held land can inhibit indigenous coordination to achieve political representation. Where communal land is informally held, indigenous groups are more likely to invest in traditional institutions that facilitate collective action to elect coethnic candidates to political office. Conversely, titling communal property secures indigenous land access but in the process erodes traditional institutions that would otherwise promote collective action during elections. I test my argument using a multi-method approach that includes interviews and experiments with three-hundred Peruvian indigenous leaders, historical land-title data, and information scraped from mayoral candidate CVs. The findings suggest that the oft-cited economic benefits of collective property may generate negative political effects.

Collective forest land rights facilitate cooperative behavior

“…Our results seemingly contradict those of a recent subnational study from Peru (Carter, 2021), which finds that in some Peruvian contexts, de jure collective property rights have weakened traditional institutions, decreasing political mobilization during national elections. The author argues that de jure collective land rights incentivize individual gains from agricultural production and greater market integration, thereby degrading cooperative behavior otherwise supported by traditional institutions.…”

“…The author argues that de jure collective land rights incentivize individual gains from agricultural production and greater market integration, thereby degrading cooperative behavior otherwise supported by traditional institutions. Although Carter (2021) compared de facto with de jure rights (not the absence of de jure rights like we do) and restricted the study to Indigenous land areas in Peru (not a multicountry study that also included non‐Indigenous groups like ours), the study still suggests that there may be contextual factors not captured by our analysis that can help determine the effect of collective titling on cooperation. Future studies would benefit from incorporating measures of such individualistic behaviors to complement the measures that we use here to gauge group behaviors.…”

Factors Determining The Elements of Communal Land for Orang Asli Communities: The Fuzzy Delphi Method

“…The United States state's collective hold on indigenous communities and institutions in terms of political representation is better understood in the context of communal land (Carter, 2021). The importance of communal land for Indigenous people has been found to be crucial for gaining access to land, nonetheless.…”

The Autonomy-Representation Dilemma: Indigenous Groups and Distributive Benefits in the Americas

“…3.Because of reciprocity institutions, indigenous voters are also more likely to support coethnic candidates (Carter, Forthcoming). See also Habyarimana et al .…”

“…In fact, “indigenous” is generally not a salient political identity in the country (Degregori, 1998; Yashar, 2005; Albó 2008, 1991). To the extent coethnic targeting occurs, it is likely due to expectations of reciprocity (Carter Forthcoming).…”