The Representational Character of Experience

Chalmers, David J.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0011

Cited by 183 publications

(256 citation statements)

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“…13 10 "One idea would be that it is looks-indexing that makes such facts available to us; the representational content of an experience can be read off of the way, in it, things looked." Travis (2004: 69) 11 Siewert (1999), Siegel (2010), Chalmers (2004). Also see Pautz (2009) Here is Travis' argument from indeterminacy of phenomenology:…”

Section: Travis' Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…38 Now given that looks need not be representational, proponents of the Weak Content View need to do two things. First of all, they need to argue for why 36 Siewert (1999), Chalmers (2004), Schellenberg (2014). 37 Chalmers (2004: 158).…”

Section: What Is In a Look?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 Despite its initial plausibility, Charles Travis has recently launched an attack on the Strong Content View. 6 The idea behind Travis' main argument is that phenomenology cannot uniquely determine representational content, and hence that perceptual experience could not be representational. Travis further argues that, contrary to Brentano and his followers, the mental is not essentially representational (intentional).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why do we need perceptual content?

Shahmoradi

2016

Philosophical Psychology

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Section: Travis' Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What Is In a Look?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why do we need perceptual content?

Shahmoradi

2016

Philosophical Psychology

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“…The Content Principle is not restricted to any particular kind of representational content: it applies to both phenomenal and externalist contents of perceptual experience. The upshot is that phenomenal character is not uniquely suited to play an epistemic role in grounding differences in perceptual justification, since there are externalist facts 17 Two--level theories of the representational content of perceptual experience are defended by Horgan and Tienson 2002, Chalmers 2004, and Siegel 2011. about perception that also play a difference--making role.…”

Section: Phenomenal Groundingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perception and the external world

Smithies

2015

Philos Stud

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Declan SmithiesThis paper begins from the assumption that perception plays an epistemic role in justifying beliefs about the external world. The aim of the paper is to explain how perception succeeds in playing this epistemic role. What is it about perception in virtue of which it justifies beliefs about the external world?The debate between internalism and externalism in the epistemology of perception can be defined in many different ways, but one key point of contention is the epistemic role of phenomenal character. This is my main focus here. So for the purposes of this paper, internalism is the thesis that perception justifies belief solely in virtue of its phenomenal character, while externalism is the thesis that perception justifies belief at least partly in virtue of externalist facts about perception that are distinct from its phenomenal character. Proponents of internalism and externalism, so defined, can agree that perception justifies beliefs about the external world, but they disagree about how it does so. This paper represents something of a change in view. Although I have defended internalism in previous work, this paper makes a modest concession to externalism. 1 At the same time, my goal is argue that externalism can depart from the letter of internalism while retaining much of its spirit. To this end, I propose a moderate version of externalism on which externalist facts play a justifying role, but only insofar as they impact on the representational content of perception. This is to be contrasted with more radical versions of externalism on which externalist facts about perception play a justifying role that need not be reflected in its representational content. The main goal of the paper is to explain why a modest concession to externalism need not open the floodgates to more radical versions of 1 In Smithies 2006 and 2014, I defend an internalist theory on which justification depends upon phenomenal character alone. To avoid false advertising, I should note that the proposal defended in this paper qualifies as internalism by many familiar definitions, including mentalism and access internalism. 2 externalism. More specifically, I argue that epistemic level--bridging principles provide a principled rationale for keeping the floodgates closed.The first four sections of the paper examine the connection between the phenomenal character of perception and its justifying role. Section one argues that phenomenal character is a necessary condition for perception to justify belief.Section two argues that phenomenal character is a difference--maker for perceptual justification in the sense that any difference in the phenomenal character of perception makes for some corresponding difference in its justifying role. Section three argues that phenomenal character is not the only difference--maker for perceptual justification, since its justifying role can differ with no corresponding difference in its phenomenal character. Section four presents a moderate version of externalism on which phenomenal character...

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“…6 Orthogonal to these distinctions between minimal, weak, and strong representationalism is the distinction between 'feature of experience' types of representationalism and 'representational 6 The terms 'weak representationalism' and 'strong representationalism' are, unfortunately, not used consistently in the extant literature. Compare, for example, Chalmers (2004), Lycan (2006) and Tye (2009). Tye's usage is most convenient for my purposes.…”

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confidence: 99%

Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?

Macpherson¹

2015

The Structure of Perceptual Experience

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The Representational Character of Experience

Cited by 183 publications

References 36 publications

Why do we need perceptual content?

Why do we need perceptual content?

Perception and the external world

Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?

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