The Relationship of Team Goals, Incentives, and Efficacy to Strategic Risk, Tactical Implementation, and Performance.

Knight, Don; Durham, Cathy C.; Locke, Edwin A.

doi:10.2307/3069459

Cited by 167 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In fact, low aspirational behavior may even hurt system performance in the long run, because this approach typically "doubles the [subsequent] repair effort and associated costs" (Goodwin et al, 2012: 60). In line with this argument, previous team-level research has found that members can realize more advanced contributions for their team when deliberately working toward more difficult and aspirational goals (Knight, Durham, & Locke, 2001). Initial empirical work at the multiteam system level has mirrored these findings, suggesting a positive relationship between aspirational behavior and multiteam system performance (Lanaj et al, 2013).…”

Section: Ifd and Multiteam System Performancesupporting

confidence: 59%

Managing coordination in multiteam systems: integrating micro and macro perspectives

Vries¹,

Hollenbeck²,

Davison³

et al. 2016

IEEE Eng. Manag. Rev.

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Section: Ifd and Multiteam System Performancesupporting

confidence: 59%

Managing coordination in multiteam systems: integrating micro and macro perspectives

Vries¹,

Hollenbeck²,

Davison³

et al. 2016

IEEE Eng. Manag. Rev.

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“…Experimental evidence from psychology …nds that higher targets induce higher levels of risk-taking (Knight et al, 2001;Larrick et al, 2009). More generally, there is also evidence that the further agents are from achieving the target, the more they are willing to take risks.…”

Section: Targets and Risk-takingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance targets, effort and risk-taking

Rablen

2010

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Growing economic and psychological evidence documents e¤ects of target setting on levels of e¤ort and risk-taking, even in the absence of a monetary reward for attaining the target. I explore a principal-agent environment in which the principal sets the agent a performance target, and the agent's intrinsic motivation to work is in ‡uenced by their performance relative to the target. When the agent has prospect theory preferences relative to the target I show that a performance target can induce greater e¤ort, but, when set too high, it eventually induces lower e¤ort. Also, the agent's preferences for risk-taking hinge on whether the target is set above or below expected output. I …nd that the principal's optimal target exceeds expected output.

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“…Several authors(i.e., [3,16,17,18,19,20,21,22]) have elaborated if inside organizations there is successful goal setting it will result in positive performance from employees. Goal setting is highlighted by numerous management systems and processes some of which are MBO, TQM and constant development measures as serious constituent for successfulness(i.e., [23,24,25,26,27]).…”

Section: Goal Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Goal setting is highlighted by numerous management systems and processes some of which are MBO, TQM and constant development measures as serious constituent for successfulness(i.e., [23,24,25,26,27]). Goal setting is investigated in two ways, first one is motivational effect in direction of enhancing performance (i.e., [3,16,28,18,19,20,21,22])and second one is essential components of management systems intended to enhance performance (i.e., [23,24,25,26,27]). Satisfaction is favorably influenced by goal setting (i.e., [29,30]).…”

Section: Goal Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%