The relationship between second‐order false belief and display rules reasoning: the integration of cognitive and affective social understanding

Naito, Mika; Seki, Yoshimi

doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00748.x

Cited by 39 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 35 publications

(132 reference statements)

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“…Growing up in a crowded urban camp with no privacy, pemulung children are socialized to be open and unpretentious and therefore may have little experience of hidden emotion. This interpretation fits with the finding that in Japan, where privacy and self-control are highly valued, children pass hidden-emotion tasks earlier than their Western counterparts (Naito & Seki, 2009).…”

Section: Cross-cultural Variations In the Sequential Acquisition Of Msupporting

confidence: 73%

Cultural Variations in the Development of Mind Reading

Slaughter

Pérez-Zapata

2014

Child Dev Perspectives

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In this article, we summarize research on the development of mind reading in different cultural contexts. Much of this work has focused on the mind-reading concept of false belief, that is, children's ability to predict what an actor is likely to do based on what he or she thinks. In all cultures tested, individuals acquire this skill in childhood, but differ cross-culturally in the age of acquisition. Studies exploring the development of other aspects of mind reading reinforce the conclusion that culture influences when and how children understand the mind.

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Section: Cross-cultural Variations In the Sequential Acquisition Of Msupporting

confidence: 73%

Cultural Variations in the Development of Mind Reading

Slaughter

Pérez-Zapata

2014

Child Dev Perspectives

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“…Japanese children’s performance on the Japanese false-belief task was comparable to their performance on the English false-belief task. These results are consistent with the most recent study that tested Japanese children with the second-order false-belief task [65]. In this study, despite the significant developmental delay in the first-order false-belief task (see also [66, 67]), Japanese children’s onset of the second-order false-belief task was about the same as the A / E children’s (i.e., between 6 and 9 years old [68, 69]).…”

Section: Evidence From Behavioral Studiessupporting

confidence: 93%

Linguistic Effects on the Neural Basis of Theory of Mind

Frank¹

2010

Open Neuroimag J

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“Theory of mind” (ToM) has been described as the ability to attribute and understand other people’s desires and intentions as distinct from one’s own. There has been a debate about the extent to which language influences ToM development. Although very few studies directly examined linguistic influence on the neural basis of ToM, results from these studies indicate at least moderate influence of language on ToM. In this review both behavioral and neurological studies that examined the relationship between language and ToM are selectively discussed. This review focuses on cross-linguistic / cultural studies (especially Japanese vs. American / English) since my colleagues and I found evidence of significant linguistic influence on the neural basis of ToM through a series of functional brain imaging experiments. Evidence from both behavioral and neurological studies of ToM (including ours) suggests that the pragmatic (not the constitutive) aspects of language influence ToM understanding more significantly.

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“…In addition, the scores for both contexts in the verbal display task were significantly or marginally higher when children gave correct answers for the second-order false belief task than when they gave incorrect answers (Table 2). These results do not conflict with previous findings (e.g., Broomfield et al, 2002;Naito & Seki, The scores were reversed to create high scores when participants selected utterances with positive or neutral emotion.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 75%

“…The child is asked to infer both the protagonist's real emotion and his or her apparent facial expression. The age at which children can distinguish between real and apparent emotion varies a bit, depending upon whether the children must spontaneously appreciate that the protagonist wishes to conceal his or her emotion (e.g., Saarni, 1979) or they are explicitly told the protagonist's motive (e.g., Harris et al, 1986); however, this research has shown that it is difficult for children to understand this distinction until the age of 6 to 8 years (Naito & Seki, 2009). …”

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confidence: 97%

Do children understand that people selectively conceal or express emotion?

Hayashi

Shiomi²

2014

International Journal of Behavioral Development

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This study examined whether children understand that people selectively conceal or express emotion depending upon the context. We prepared two contexts for a verbal display task for 70 first-graders, 80 third-graders, 64 fifth-graders, and 71 adults. In both contexts, protagonists had negative feelings because of the behavior of the other character. In the prosocial context, children were instructed that the protagonist wished to spare the other character's feelings. In contrast, in the real-emotion context, children were told that the protagonist was fed up with the other character's behavior. Participants were asked to imagine what the protagonists would say. Adults selected utterances with positive or neutral emotion in the prosocial context but chose utterances with negative emotion in the realemotion context, whereas first-graders selected utterances with negative emotion in both contexts. In the prosocial context, the proportion of utterances with negative emotion decreased from first-graders to adults, whereas in the real-emotion context the proportion was U-shaped, decreasing from first-to third-graders and increasing from fifth-graders to adults. Further, performance on both contexts was associated with second-order false beliefs as well as second-order intention understanding. These results indicate that children begin to understand that people selectively conceal or express emotion depending upon context after 8 to 9 years. This ability is also related to second-order theory of mind.

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The relationship between second‐order false belief and display rules reasoning: the integration of cognitive and affective social understanding

Cited by 39 publications

References 35 publications

Cultural Variations in the Development of Mind Reading

Cultural Variations in the Development of Mind Reading

Linguistic Effects on the Neural Basis of Theory of Mind

Do children understand that people selectively conceal or express emotion?

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