The refutation of cyclic evaluations

Abstract

CYCLIC PREFERENCES or evaluations usually are supposed to be defective in some sense, inconsistent or at least irrational. This is the received view in most works in ethics, decision theory and other fields where the possibility is seriously considered. From time to time, however, the received view is questioned, Cases are described where we find apparently rational cyclic preferences or apparently sound arguments which take us from seemingly innocent assumptions to cyclic evaluations.Here I shall consider two different kinds of such counterexamples and then present a direct argument against cyclic evaluations.

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than*

“…See Qizilbash () and Wasserman (). Similar claims about similar arguments have been made by Ackerman (), Danielsson (), Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (), and Voorhoeve and Binmore ().…”

“…This is also observed by Carlson (). Danielsson () makes a similar point in terms of choiceworthiness.…”

“…Interestingly, monotonicity has received little attention in the theory of value. See, however, Carlson (; ; ) and Danielsson (). Another exception may be Aristotle, whom Sahlin (, 185) quotes as seeing “nothing to prevent even things which are not good from being preferable to things which are good” ( Topics , III.2 117a20–22).…”

Rational intransitive preferences

“… 45. See for this problem also Danielsson 1996, Nebel 2018: 877, and, with respect to satisficing: Klocksiem 2016: 1321–1322.…”