“…Because pre-privatization (pre-structuring) firms tend to be over-manned and to pay excessive wages, incumbent employees have been afraid of privatization. 1 The privatization literature has been mostly concerned with motivation, optimal methods and the desirable post-privatization ownership structure (e.g., Baldwin and Bhattacharyya, 1991;Boardman and Vining, 1989;Bonin, 1992;Bös and Harms, 1997;Boycko et al, 1996;Estrin, 1994;Galal et al, 1992;Haskel and Szymanski, 1993;Hillman, 1992;Jackson and Price, 1994;Kay and Thompson, 1986;Katz and Owen, 1995;Laffont and Tirole, 1992;Megginson and Nash, 1994;Megginson et al, 1996;Roland, 1994;Tian, 2000;Yarrow, 1988, 1991;Yarrow, 1986); scant attention has been given to implementation and the role of the employees' resistance in the successful implementation of privatization and restructuring initiatives. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by studying the effect of a conflict of interests between employees and the government (owners) on the successful implementation of the government's privatization (owners' restructuring) plans, which ultimately determines the cost of the process and the extent of successful implementation.…”