The Purity Thesis

Paulson, Stanley L.

doi:10.1111/raju.12217

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…La eficacia por correspondencia ha sido trabajada por diferentes autores. Ingram (1983) plantea que cuando recurrimos a Kelsen, en un intento por comprender la conexión entre la coerción y la ley, se llega a una teoría que requiere explícitamente eficacia y es que, como menciona este autor, para Kelsen la eficacia se convierte en una condición de validez (Paulson, 2018). Si bien en su trabajo Ingram (1983) establece que no es necesario explorar en detalle la relación de eficacia con el sistema legal y las leyes individuales con respecto a la validez, sí es necesario saber cómo identificar exactamente la eficacia.…”

Section: La Eficacia De La Norma Jurídica Como Método De Aprendizajeunclassified

La eficacia como método de aprendizaje de la realidad normativa

Poveda

Tirado²

2022

Rev. pedagog. univ. didact. derecho

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Este artículo presenta la eficacia como estrategia pedagógica que permite el estudio del derecho mucho más allá de la tradicional apuesta positiva y dogmática, admite un proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje que conlleva la interrelación entre dogmática, semiótica y realidad sociopolítica, que permite analizar un derecho vivo y en disposición al servicio del sistema al que pertenece. Se propone un estudio holístico desde tres enfoques; la eficacia de la norma jurídica desde su capacidad para producir efectos jurídicos, la eficacia de la norma jurídica para motivar su aplicación y la eficacia de la norma jurídica desde el poder que tiene la norma para generar símbolos.

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Section: La Eficacia De La Norma Jurídica Como Método De Aprendizajeunclassified

La eficacia como método de aprendizaje de la realidad normativa

Poveda

Tirado²

2022

Rev. pedagog. univ. didact. derecho

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“…18 The only exception is an earlier attempt I made in (Pavlakos, 2019), which is however incomplete. For a discussion of Kelsenian non-naturalism that sets it into the context of the history of ideas see (Paulson, 2018). 19 The independence referred to in this context is primarily epistemic, not metaphysical, for Kelsen recognises that law is not independent of the realm of naturalistic facts (Kelsen, 1992, p. 8).…”

Section: Kelsenian Non-naturalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Non-Naturalist Account of Law’s Place in Reality

Pavlakos¹

2021

Law and Mind

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This chapter aims to outline the contours of a non-naturalist account of legal phenomena. Although it does not address the relevance of cognitive sciences to law specifically, the argument developed here aims to demonstrate that the said relevance depends on the antecedent question about the requirements of explanation of legal phenomena in terms of non-legal, more basic facts. By demonstrating the failure of naturalistic facts to meet the requirements of explanation, the chapter calls into question the relevance of cognitive science to law. In the first part I propose to understand naturalism in law as an explanatory claim about the (metaphysical) determinants of legal facts. Then I explore a family of objections against physicalism in the philosophy of mind (epistemic gap arguments) and argue that they apply equally to naturalistic explanations in the legal domain. But there is a key disanalogy between the two domains: while in the philosophy of mind explanatory gap arguments show that mental phenomena involve fundamental, non-physical facts, which are explanatorily basic, in the legal domain explanatory gap arguments show that the explanation of legal facts requires us to appeal to additional non-naturalistic facts which can bridge the gap of explanation between the legal facts and their non-legal determinants. I discuss briefly two versions of legal non-naturalism and proceed to develop the one that is based onKelsen's account of legal cognition which, as it turns out, is surprisingly compatible with the groundtheoretic debates in contemporary metaphysics.

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Kelsen, Hans

Paulson¹

2020

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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The legal philosopher Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) is regarded in many circles as the quintessential figure in analytical legal philosophy, whose only possible rival in originality and scope is Jeremy Bentham. As with other legal positivists, Kelsen rejects morality as a criterion for legal validity. He parts company with other legal positivists in rejecting an appeal to social facts as undergirding the legal system. He is waging battle, then, on two fronts, which leads him to appeal to the Kant of the first Critique with an eye to a transcendental argument that will lend support to his nonnaturalistic view of the law. Along with his extensive work in the field of legal philosophy, Kelsen was active in the immediate post‐World War I period as one of the draftsmen of the Austrian Federal Constitution of October 1920. Here his epochal contribution was to establish centralized constitutional review, an institutional practice that was adopted by other European countries after World War II. Kelsen was also active in public international law and in political philosophy, where he defended political liberalism. A “Collected Works” of Kelsen's writings, projected to run to well over 30 volumes, is under way.

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The Purity Thesis

Cited by 4 publications

References 52 publications

La eficacia como método de aprendizaje de la realidad normativa

La eficacia como método de aprendizaje de la realidad normativa

A Non-Naturalist Account of Law’s Place in Reality

Kelsen, Hans

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