The Proper Province of Philosophy

Abstract

The practice of conceptual analysis has undergone a revival in recent years. Although the extent of its role in philosophy is controversial, many now accept that conceptual analysis has at least some role to play. Granting this, I consider the relevance of empirical investigation to conceptual analysis. I do so by contrasting an extreme position (anti-empirical conceptual analysis) with a more moderate position (non-empirical conceptual analysis). I argue that anti-empirical conceptual analysis is not a viable position because it has no means for resolving conceptual disputes that arise between seemingly competent speakers of the language. This is illustrated by considering one such dispute that has been pressed by a prominent advocate of anti-empirical conceptual analysis: Bennett and Hacker (2003) assert that psychological predicates only logically apply to whole living animals, but many scientists and philosophers use the terms more broadly. I argue that to resolve such disputes we need to empirically investigate the common understanding of the terms at issue. I then show how this can be done by presenting the results of three studies concerning the application of "calculates" to computers.Conceptual analysis as a topic of philosophical discussion has seen something of a resurgence over the past decade. Much of this resurgence owes to Frank Jackson's (1998) defense of the practice. He argues that conceptual analysis is both more important and more common than has recently been thought (see also Jackson

Conceptual Analysis and African Philosophy

“…One reason they give is that philosophical intuitions take up the whole space in conceptual analysis, such that empirical investigations seem to have no place at all. It is worth pointing out that accounts of conceptual analysis that include empirical investigations have since been given (e.g., Sytsma, 2010), but let us continue with Laurence and Margolis' criticism. What they do not say is that conceptual analysis does not play any role in philosophizing whatsoever.…”

What do plants and bacteria want? Commentary on Carrie Figdor's Pieces of mind

“…Rather, before such advances, many psychological predicates were already polysemous, and some of these uses were already broad, allowing ascription to insects and even artifacts. (For instance, Sytsma (2010) has experimentally shown that people ascribe “computing” to artifacts literally.) Note that this is yet another reason to be skeptical of Figdor's claim about anthropocentrism.…”

CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, GENERICS AND THE CANBERRA PLAN1

“…4 4 See, for example, Ramsey (1992), Stich and Weinberg (2001), Laurence and Margolis (2003), Sytsma (2010), and Banicki (2012). …”