CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, GENERICS AND THE CANBERRA PLAN<sup>1</sup>

Johnston, Mark; Leslie, Sarah‐Jane

doi:10.1111/phpe.12015

Cited by 19 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 72 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The Canberra plan is a perfect starting place for our inquiry into what an inconsistency theorist ought to say about the metaphysics of truth. In fact, the Canberra 9 See (Braddon-Mitchell and Robert 2009) and Johnston and Leslie (2012) for discussions of the Canberra Plan. 10 There are other ways of pursuing analytic projects besides the Canberra plan, but we have good reason to think they would deliver the same results.…”

Section: The Planmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts

Scharp

2020

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What is the property of being true like? To answer this question, begin with a Canberra-plan analysis of the concept of truth. That is, assemble the platitudes for the concept of truth, and then investigate which property might satisfy them. This project is aided by Friedman and Sheard's groundbreaking analysis of twelve logical platitudes for truth. It turns out that, because of the paradoxes like the liar, the platitudes for the concept of truth are inconsistent. Moreover, there are so many distinct paradoxes that only small subsets of platitudes for truth are consistent. The result is that there is no property of being true. The failure of the Canberra plan analysis of the concept of truth, points the way toward a new methodology: a conceptual engineering project for the concept of truth. Conceptual engineering is assessing the quality of our concepts, and when they are found defective, offering new and better concepts to replace them for certain purposes. Still, there are many aletheic properties, which are properties satisfied by reasonably large subsets of platitudes for the concept of truth. We can treat these aletheic properties as a guide to the multitude of new aletheic concepts, which are concepts similar to, but distinct from, the concept of truth. Any new aletheic concept or team of concepts might be called on to replace the concept of truth. In particular, the concepts of ascending truth and descending truth are recommended, but the most important point is that we need a full-scale investigation into the space of aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts-that is, we need an Aletheic Principles Project (APP).

show abstract

Section: The Planmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts

Scharp

2020

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…3 For a recent overview of the literature on the semantics of bare plurals, see Sterken (2017). 4 For instance, see Asher and Bonevac (1996), Cheng (2011), Haslanger (2010), Haslanger (2014), Johnston and Leslie (2012), Lerner and Leslie (2013), Leslie (2017), Nickel (2010), Sorensen (2012), and Wasserman (2011). press propositions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The radical account of bare plural generics

Nguyen

2019

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…As Johnston and Leslie (, p. 116) remark, “something like this substantial picture has a good claim to be at the motivating core of what was once called ‘analytical philosophy’ – from Gottlob Frege, Kurt Gödel, A.J. Ayer, H.P.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism

Valente

2019

Theoria

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I suggest a solution to a conflict between semantic internalism – according to which the concepts one expresses are determined by one's use of representations – and publicity – according to which, if two subjects successfully communicate or are in genuine agreement, then they entertain thoughts constituted by the same concepts. My solution rests on the thesis that there can be successful communication and genuine agreement between thinkers employing distinct concepts as long as there is a certain relation (of conceptually guaranteed sameness of extension) between them. In section 2, I motivate semantic internalism and show how it conflicts with publicity. In section 3, I carve the logical space of possible solutions to the conflict into liberal and conservative solutions. Section 4 assesses Wikforss's conservative solution to Burge's arthritis thought‐experiment and concludes that it fails for more than one reason. Section 5 introduces a new case study involving a deferential concept. This case serves as the backdrop for my positive account offered in section 6. The conclusion of the article is preceded by a comparison of my view with another recently proposed by Recanati (section 7) and some replies to possible objections (section 8).

show abstract

CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, GENERICS AND THE CANBERRA PLAN¹

Cited by 19 publications

References 72 publications

Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts

Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts

The radical account of bare plural generics

Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, GENERICS AND THE CANBERRA PLAN1

Cited by 19 publications

References 72 publications

Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts

Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts

The radical account of bare plural generics

Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, GENERICS AND THE CANBERRA PLAN¹