“…Accordingly, the Consequence Argument targets responsibility only indirectly-via a conjunction with a principle like PAP. The Direct Argument, however, uses similar "ingredients" as the Consequence Argument, but it targets moral 7 Here I am anticipating responses to the manipulation argument along the lines of Fischer (2011) and King (2013). Their challenge can be summarized as follows:…”
Section: A Methodological Interludementioning
confidence: 99%
“… Here I am anticipating responses to the manipulation argument along the lines of Fischer () and King (). Their challenge can be summarized as follows:Either the manipulation does work in making the agent unfree, in which case the manipulation scenario is after all not equivalent to natural determination, or the manipulation does no work in making the agent unfree, in which case it is irrelevant to moral responsibility, and manipulation arguments get us nowhere. As I am trying to indicate, the problem with this argument regards the second “horn” of the alleged dilemma.…”
I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism -the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana (the designer) really gave Ernie (the designed) free will, why isn't she worried that he won't use it precisely as she would like? Diana's non-nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie's non-freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of the principle of alternative possibilities for compatibilist theories of responsibility. Along the way, I clarify the dialectical role and structure of "manipulation arguments", and compare the manipulation argument I develop with the more familiar Consequence Argument. I contend that the two arguments are importantly mutually supporting and reinforcing. The result: classical compatibilists should be nervous -and if PAP is true, all compatibilists should be nervous.
“…Accordingly, the Consequence Argument targets responsibility only indirectly-via a conjunction with a principle like PAP. The Direct Argument, however, uses similar "ingredients" as the Consequence Argument, but it targets moral 7 Here I am anticipating responses to the manipulation argument along the lines of Fischer (2011) and King (2013). Their challenge can be summarized as follows:…”
Section: A Methodological Interludementioning
confidence: 99%
“… Here I am anticipating responses to the manipulation argument along the lines of Fischer () and King (). Their challenge can be summarized as follows:Either the manipulation does work in making the agent unfree, in which case the manipulation scenario is after all not equivalent to natural determination, or the manipulation does no work in making the agent unfree, in which case it is irrelevant to moral responsibility, and manipulation arguments get us nowhere. As I am trying to indicate, the problem with this argument regards the second “horn” of the alleged dilemma.…”
I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism -the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana (the designer) really gave Ernie (the designed) free will, why isn't she worried that he won't use it precisely as she would like? Diana's non-nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie's non-freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of the principle of alternative possibilities for compatibilist theories of responsibility. Along the way, I clarify the dialectical role and structure of "manipulation arguments", and compare the manipulation argument I develop with the more familiar Consequence Argument. I contend that the two arguments are importantly mutually supporting and reinforcing. The result: classical compatibilists should be nervous -and if PAP is true, all compatibilists should be nervous.
“…(King [2013] attempts to present a case of indeterministic manipulation in which Kane's [1996] conditions are satisfied, but, as I argue in Cyr [2016], Kane's conditions are not satisfied by the agent in King's case. I also argue, however, that the case can be modified such that the agent does satisfy Kane's conditions, and the modified case allows for a challenge to Kane's brand of libertarianism.…”
Section: Recent Manipulation-based Worries For Libertarian Accountsmentioning
In response to the increasingly popular manipulation argument against compatibilism, some have argued that libertarian accounts of free will are vulnerable to parallel manipulation arguments, and thus manipulation is not uniquely problematic for compatibilists. The main aim of this article is to give this point a more detailed development than it has previously received. Prior attempts to make this point have targeted particular libertarian accounts but cannot be generalized. By contrast, I provide an appropriately modified manipulation that targets all libertarian accounts of freedom and responsibility—an especially tricky task given that libertarian accounts are a motley set. I conclude that if manipulation arguments reveal any theoretical cost then it is one borne by all accounts according to which we are free and responsible, not by compatibilism in particular.
“…4 For defenses, see Fischer (2011), McKenna (2004 and Talbert (2009). See King (2013) for an argument that such cases do not (and cannot) count in favor of incompatibilism, and Tognazzini (2014) for a response. 5 Mele himself calls cases like Ernie's "original design cases" and contrasts them with manipulation cases, which involve the covert alteration or management of an already existing agent's beliefs, values, dispositions, etc.…”
Section: Manipulation and Moral Standingmentioning
The majority of recent work on the moral standing to blame (the idea that A may be unable to legitimately blame B despite B being blameworthy) has focused on blamers who themselves are blameworthy. This is unfortunate, for there is much to learn about the standing to blame once we consider a broader range of cases. Doing so reveals that challenged standing is more expansive than previously acknowledged, and accounts that have privileged the fact that the blamers are themselves morally culpable likely require revision. One such account figures in Patrick Todd’s (2012) argument for incompatibilism, which ostensibly depends on considerations involving the standing to blame. I believe this argument fails. But its failure is instructive, for it allows us to appreciate the numerous ways in which one’s blame can be morally problematic, and hence ways in which one’s standing to blame can be challenged. Thus, while one objective of this paper is to show why Todd’s argument fails, the larger aim is to use that argument to frame discussion of some important (and novel) ways in which the standing to blame can be compromised.
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