The Problem of Trope Individuation: A Reply to Lowe

Keinänen, Markku; Hakkarainen, Jani

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9459-y

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In our example, we assumed the further fact that only t1=t1=e charge, t2=t2=e charge, and t3=t3=e/3 charge hold in the scheme. This is in line with the view we have argued for elsewhere that the identity of simple standard tropes is primitive: they do not have informative or non-circular identity-conditions that are given by entities distinct from the tropes (Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2014).…”

Section: Response To Ehringsupporting

confidence: 90%

The Ontological Form of Tropes

Hakkarainen

Keinänen

2017

Philosophia

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According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring's reductio ad absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring's argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons.

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Section: Response To Ehringsupporting

confidence: 90%

The Ontological Form of Tropes

Hakkarainen

Keinänen

2017

Philosophia

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“…The fact that tropes are particular is fundamental, given by primitive distinctness (see Campbell 1990, 56-57;Trettin 2000, 283-84). The identity and identity conditions of tropes are also primitive (see Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2014).…”

Section: Classical Trope Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Instantiation in Trope Theory

Fisher¹

2018

American Philosophical Quarterly

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The concept of instantiation is realized differently across a variety of metaphysical theories. A certain realization of the concept in a given theory depends on what roles are specified and associated with the concept and its corresponding term as well as what entities are suited to fill those roles. In this paper, the classic realization of the concept of instantiation in a one-category ontology of abstract particulars or tropes is articulated in a novel way and defended against unaddressed objections.

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“…Thus, for instance, universals might be considered as countable individual objects or non-countable entities with determinate identity conditions. 6 Most of the recent trope theorists consider the individuation of tropes as primitive, cf., e.g., Campbell (1990); Ehring (2011) and Keinänen & Hakkarainen (2013). Schaffer (2001) individuates tropes by their spatiotemporal location, which seems to conflict with their identity independence.…”

Section: Quantity Tropes: the Basic Constituents Of Objectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tropes, Causal Processes and Functional Laws

Keinänen¹

2014

Substantiality and Causality

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In this article, I start with the assumption that all fundamental monadic properties dispositional quantity tropes. I argue that the dispositional tropes and the causal processes they produce can, in relevant part, account for the truth of causal functional laws (such as Coulomb law): laws of nature that describe the forces the quantitative properties falling under a determinable generate as a function of their distance. Following Ellis & Lierse (1994) and Ellis (2001), I adopt the claim that a large group of the dispositional properties figuring in functional laws are causal powers and that their manifestations are causal processes. The forces (gravitational force, Coulomb force) resulting from these causal processes are connected by the proportion relations in accordance with the formal proportion relations between the tropes producing the processes. Hence, property tropes and the respective causal processes suffice to secure that the resulting forces accord with the functional formula.

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The Problem of Trope Individuation: A Reply to Lowe

Cited by 10 publications

References 12 publications

The Ontological Form of Tropes

The Ontological Form of Tropes

Instantiation in Trope Theory

Tropes, Causal Processes and Functional Laws

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