The Ontological Form of Tropes

Hakkarainen, Jani; Keinänen, Markku

doi:10.1007/s11406-017-9848-6

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Formal ontological relations determine category membership since they determine the form of being of their relata (Lowe 2006, ch. 3.2;Simons 2012;Hakkarainen and Keinänen 2017;Hakkarainen 2018). Hence, the relata-specific answer presupposes that specific adherence is a formal ontological relation between a relational trope and its relata.…”

Section: Relata-specific Answer To Bradley's Relation Regressmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific Answer

Hakkarainen

Keinänen

2022

Acta Anal

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F. H. Bradley’s relation regress poses a difficult problem for metaphysics of relations. In this paper, we reconstruct this regress argument systematically and make its presuppositions explicit in order to see where the possibility of its solution or resolution lies. We show that it cannot be answered by claiming that it is not vicious. Neither is one of the most promising resolutions, the relata-specific answer adequate in its present form. It attempts to explain adherence (relating), which is a crucial component of the explanandum of Bradley’s relation regress, in terms of specific adherence of a relational trope to its relata. Nevertheless, since we do not know the consequences and constituents of a trope adhering to its specific relata, it remains unclear what specific adherence is. It is left as a constitutively inexplicable primitive. The relata-specific answer only asserts against Bradley. This negative conclusion highlights the need for a metaphysical account of the constitution of the holding of adherence.

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Section: Relata-specific Answer To Bradley's Relation Regressmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…concurrent) with i. Fundamentally, tropes are particular natures (like particular -e charge in some location) and certain kinds of parts of objects (Hakkarainen and Keinänen 2017;Hakkarainen 2018).…”

Section: Relata-specific Answer To Bradley's Relation Regressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific Answer

Hakkarainen

Keinänen

2022

Acta Anal

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“…An analogy will elucidate this point. Consider the standard view of tropes (Williams 1953;Campbell 1990;Simons 1994;Maurin 2002;Hakkarainen and Keinänen 2017). According to it, some tropes are mereologically simple entities that lack any constituents.…”

Section: Two Senses Of Dispositionality and Qualitativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Identity Theory of Powers Revised

Giannotti

2019

Erkenn

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Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a contradiction objection that undermines its merits. We should therefore consider an alternative version that does not embrace the identity claim. My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I shall argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I will conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities.

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A bundle theory of words

Miller

2019

Synthese

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It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is ontologically more parsimonious, and coheres with claims in linguistics.

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The Ontological Form of Tropes

Cited by 9 publications

References 16 publications

Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific Answer

Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific Answer

The Identity Theory of Powers Revised

A bundle theory of words

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