The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective

Overgaard, Søren

doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9014-7

Cited by 28 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…This is known as ''the problem of other minds.'' That is, faced only with other bodies, infants must determine whether these bodies also have minds, and they must learn how to communicate with other people [Overgaard, 2006]. It follows from this that it is possible to understand others either at the behavioral level or the mental level.…”

Section: The Dualist Worldviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Meaning and Mind from the Perspective of Dualist versus Relational Worldviews: Implications for the Development of Pointing Gestures

Carpendale¹,

Atwood²,

Kettner³

2013

Human Development

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Worldviews consist of preconceptions about the nature of mind, knowledge, and meaning, and these assumptions influence theorizing about human development and the interpretation of research. We outline two contrasting worldviews - dualist versus relational - and explicate the implications of such preconceptions for studying the development of pointing gestures. Pointing is a pivotal social skill that is an aspect of social understanding, as well as a foundational form of interaction for language. In studying the development of pointing it is possible to observe how infants develop the social skills required to convey meaning in human ways. Thus, this is an area in which to examine the nature and development of meaning, and an adequate conception of meaning is necessary for theories of language and cognition. We argue that dualist approaches have problems that can be avoided by adopting a relational worldview and the relational developmental systems framework that follows from it, which we suggest is a fruitful approach to theorizing about human development.

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Section: The Dualist Worldviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Meaning and Mind from the Perspective of Dualist versus Relational Worldviews: Implications for the Development of Pointing Gestures

Carpendale¹,

Atwood²,

Kettner³

2013

Human Development

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“…But Wittgenstein, by contrast, is often claimed to hold precisely that. Hence, Wittgenstein is taken to be one of the main historical proponents of a view that has, more recently, been defended by Austin (), Gallagher (), McDowell (), Overgaard (, , , ), Smith (, ), and Zahavi (Overgaard & Zahavi, ), among others…”

Section: Wittgenstein On Mindreadingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Wittgenstein, by contrast, is often taken, by figures including Sean Gallagher (, p. 538), Søren Overgaard (, p. 65; , p. 460), Joel Smith (, p. 732), Somogy Varga (, p. 788), and Dan Zahavi (Overgaard & Zahavi, , p. 73ff), to represent the view that our ability to read others' thoughts and feelings can, in many cases, be explained in terms of perception alone. In this, Wittgenstein's views are held to agree with those of phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty (Overgaard, ; ; Overgaard & Zahavi, ) . Such a view is typically attributed to Wittgenstein on the basis of a series of remarks from his later manuscripts on the philosophy of psychology.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wittgenstein, mindreading and perception

Dain

2019

European J of Philosophy

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Can we perceive others' mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: He is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others' emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not “Is this perception?” but “What do we mean by ‘perception' here?” and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call “perception” here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein's answer to the question “Can we perceive others' mental states?” is yes and no: Both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.

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“…(Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 415) We find similar ideas in other phenomenologists as well, such as Levinas's characterization of our experiential encounter with the face of the other (Levinas 1999;cf. Krueger 2008;Overgaard 2006) and Stein's account of empathy (Stein 1989;cf. Jardine and Szanto 2017).…”

Section: Dsp In Its Historical Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct Social Perception

Krueger

2018

The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition

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Defenders of a view called “direct social perception” (DSP) argue that our social-cognitive capacities rest on our ability to directly perceive others’ mental states—their emotions, desires, intentions, etc.—embodied in their expressive, goal-directed behavior. DSP thus challenges the widespread assumption that mental states are intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible to everyone but their owner. In this chapter, I consider a version of DSP that draws upon phenomenology, 4E cognition, and empirical work in cognitive science. I first examine DSP in its historical context, focusing on its development in the hands of phenomenologists like Husserl, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty. I then consider some supporting arguments and empirical evidence—particularly work suggesting that embodied expressions of emotions (e.g., facial expressions, gestures, etc.) may constitute part of the emotion itself. I conclude by defending DSP against several objections.

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The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective

Cited by 28 publications

References 12 publications

Meaning and Mind from the Perspective of Dualist versus Relational Worldviews: Implications for the Development of Pointing Gestures

Meaning and Mind from the Perspective of Dualist versus Relational Worldviews: Implications for the Development of Pointing Gestures

Wittgenstein, mindreading and perception

Direct Social Perception

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