Using as a background the ongoing crisis afflicting the international cricket scene over whether or not to boycott Zimbabwe, this paper seeks to explore the moral complexities surrounding the case of the sporting boycott in general as a response to morally odious regimes. Rather than attempting to provide some easy formula by which to determine justifiable from unjustifiable boycotts, we take as our starting point many of the arguments raised in the national press and explore and develop these arguments in order to shed light on the fundamental problems underlying the use of sporting boycotts as moral tools. The paper thus aims to show the inadequacy of the standard responses on both sides of the fence and, hopefully, clears the ground for future, more informed approaches to the issue.Does it not go against the grain, to play [cricket] with a country whose opponents are too frightened to go into hospital to have wounds inflicted by the security forces treated for fear that they will be injected with slow-acting poisons by the Central Intelligence Organisation?Mike Brearley 1Cricket is not qualified to do the job of politicians. Ali Bacher 2Brearley here expresses an intuition shared by many: that there is something inherently wrong in maintaining normal sporting relations with a country ruled by an odious regime. This article raises a basic question: is there such a thing? Is there, as a recent Early Day Motion in the UK House of Commons suggests, a matter of principle about sporting boycotts? 3 Are there distinctions which make a difference, ethically speaking, between sporting boycotts and other related actions (economic sanctions, for example) in these respects? Because of its topicality, and also because of the particular nature of international relations in cricket, we take recent cricketing relations between England and Zimbabwe as our main point of reference in what follows. 4 Our aim is to look at the shape of debates on the rights and wrongs of sporting boycotts, through the prism of that controversy. A central part of our argument is that much of the debate about sporting boycotts is characterised by different kinds of bad faith. To say, as many do, that sporting relations are somehow beyond the range of the moral compass is a claim as extravagant and dangerous as it is untenable. But to present sporting boycotts as a kind of catch-all solution to the problems of moral conscience to which they are addressed is to risk a mischaracterisation of both their nature and their scope. Just as sport is not beyond the scope of 'everyday' moral and political activity
Using as a background the ongoing crisis afflicting the international cricket scene over whether or not to boycott Zimbabwe, this paper seeks to explore the moral complexities surrounding the case of the sporting boycott in general as a response to morally odious regimes. Rather than attempting to provide some easy formula by which to determine justifiable from unjustifiable boycotts, we take as our starting point many of the arguments raised in the national press and explore and develop these arguments in order to shed light on the fundamental problems underlying the use of sporting boycotts as moral tools. The paper thus aims to show the inadequacy of the standard responses on both sides of the fence and, hopefully, clears the ground for future, more informed approaches to the issue.Does it not go against the grain, to play [cricket] with a country whose opponents are too frightened to go into hospital to have wounds inflicted by the security forces treated for fear that they will be injected with slow-acting poisons by the Central Intelligence Organisation?Mike Brearley 1Cricket is not qualified to do the job of politicians. Ali Bacher 2Brearley here expresses an intuition shared by many: that there is something inherently wrong in maintaining normal sporting relations with a country ruled by an odious regime. This article raises a basic question: is there such a thing? Is there, as a recent Early Day Motion in the UK House of Commons suggests, a matter of principle about sporting boycotts? 3 Are there distinctions which make a difference, ethically speaking, between sporting boycotts and other related actions (economic sanctions, for example) in these respects? Because of its topicality, and also because of the particular nature of international relations in cricket, we take recent cricketing relations between England and Zimbabwe as our main point of reference in what follows. 4 Our aim is to look at the shape of debates on the rights and wrongs of sporting boycotts, through the prism of that controversy. A central part of our argument is that much of the debate about sporting boycotts is characterised by different kinds of bad faith. To say, as many do, that sporting relations are somehow beyond the range of the moral compass is a claim as extravagant and dangerous as it is untenable. But to present sporting boycotts as a kind of catch-all solution to the problems of moral conscience to which they are addressed is to risk a mischaracterisation of both their nature and their scope. Just as sport is not beyond the scope of 'everyday' moral and political activity
Can we perceive others' mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: He is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others' emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not “Is this perception?” but “What do we mean by ‘perception' here?” and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call “perception” here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein's answer to the question “Can we perceive others' mental states?” is yes and no: Both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.
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