The problem of equal moral status

Abstract

A central puzzle of contemporary moral and political philosophy is that while most of us believe that all or almost all human beings enjoy the same moral status, human beings possess the capacities that supposedly ground moral status to very unequal levels. This paper aims to develop a novel strategy to vindicate the idea of moral equality against this challenge. Its central argument is that the puzzle emerges only if one accepts a usually unstated theoretical premise about value and the proper response to value. The premise holds that if the presence of a valuable property warrants a certain kind of response towards its bearers, then every variation in the degree to which the property is present necessarily constitutes a reason for a corresponding variation in the response that is warranted towards its bearers. It argues that despite its intuitive appeal, the premise is not plausible as a general view about the proper way of responding to value, and as a view about responding to the value of rational beings in particular. It proposes an account of the proper manner of valuing rational beings that supports a distinctive version of the so-called threshold approach to justifying equal moral status.

Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: a reply to Miller

“…The problem -which has been discussed in different contexts 2 -is explained by Christopher Kaczor as follows.…”

Inclusive dignity

“…A theory of justice and rights for institutions may carry different strictures than one only centered on individuals’ acts, for example. For a recent account defending a threshold-based conception of moral status, see Miklosi (2022) . See also the contributions in Steinhoff (2014) .…”