The Pricing of Critical Applications in the Internet

Crémer, Jacques; Hariton, Cyril

doi:10.1006/jjie.1999.0431

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“… 28 Congestion pricing in computer networks is studied by Cocchi et al (1993), Mackie‐Mason and Varian (1995), Shenker et al (1996) and Crémer and Hariton (1999). …”

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confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

Sandholm¹

2002

Rev Econ Studies

200

103

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We consider an implementation problem faced by a planner who manages a roadway network. The problem entails both hidden information and hidden actions. We solve the planner's problem by introducing a new class of mechanisms and a new notion of implementation. The mechanisms, called price schemes, attach transfers to the available routes; they do not involve direct revelation. The method of implementation is evolutionary, requiring that players who follow any reasonable myopic adjustment process eventually learn to behave as the planner desires. We show that efficient behavior can be guaranteed using simple, decentralized price schemes.JEL Classification Numbers: C61, C72, C73, D62, D82, R41, R48.

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“… 28 Congestion pricing in computer networks is studied by Cocchi et al (1993), Mackie‐Mason and Varian (1995), Shenker et al (1996) and Crémer and Hariton (1999). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

Sandholm¹

2002

Rev Econ Studies

200

103

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“…In doing this, we are going to use an analytical set up inspired to the noncooperative subgame implementation theory under complete information. 6 More specifically, we suggest a slight modification of the two stage mechanism proposed by Jackson and Moulin [12] for distributing public projects' costs among individuals. It will be argued that through this game form, a capacity sharing solution in which players are using a dominant strategy is implemented.…”

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confidence: 99%

On capacity sharing in network congestion epochs

Lanzi

2004

Netnomics

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Seeing network resources as a public good involves to mantain open and shared access to them for any user. Nevertheless, these conditions may be really difficult to achieve in presence of well-endowed users with heavy data flows. Our purpose here is to provide a two stage game form for managing heavy data flows which may cause network congestion or monopolization. Using an axiomatic approach, we show that the mechanism proposed attains economic efficiency and it implements capacity sharing. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004capacity sharing, congested networks, subgame implementation,

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“… 16 For further discussion of this issue, see Cocchi, Shenker, Estrin and Zhang (1993). Other models of pricing in computer networks include MacKie‐Mason and Varian (1995), Shenker, Clark, Estrin and Herzog (1996), and Crémer and Hariton (1999). …”

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confidence: 99%

Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation

Sandholm¹

2005

The Review of Economic Studies

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We model externality abatement as an implementation problem. A social planner would like to ensure efficient behaviour among a group of agents whose actions are sources of externalities. However, the planner has limited information about the agents' preferences, and is unable to distinguish individual agents except through their action choices. We prove that if a concavity condition on aggregate payoffs is satisfied, the planner can guarantee that efficient behaviour is globally stable under a wide range of behaviour adjustment processes by administering a variable pricing scheme. Through a series of applications, we show that the concavity condition is naturally satisfied in settings involving negative externalities. We conclude by contrasting the performance of the pricing mechanism with that of a mechanism based on direct revelation and announcement dependent forcing contracts. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2005.

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The Pricing of Critical Applications in the Internet

Cited by 12 publications

References 10 publications

Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

On capacity sharing in network congestion epochs

Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation

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