Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

Sandholm, William H.

doi:10.1111/1467-937x.t01-1-00026

Cited by 200 publications

(121 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

119

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Guo et al (2013Guo et al ( , 2015 pointed out that the same feature can be found in the link-based models such as He et al (2010), Han and Du (2012) and Smith and Mounce (2011). The RBAP-like models with elastic demand were proposed in Sandholm (2002Sandholm ( , 2005, Yang (2007) and Li et al (2012).…”

Section: Rational Behavior Adjustment Processmentioning

confidence: 76%

Exploration of day-to-day route choice models by a virtual experiment

Xiao

Yang

2018

Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines existing day-to-day models based on a virtual day-to-day route choice experiment using the latest mobile internet techniques. With the realized day-to-day path flows and path travel times in the experiment, we calibrate several welldesigned path-based day-to-day models who take the Wardrop's user equilibrium as (part of) their stationary states. The nonlinear effects of path flows and path time differences on the path swapping are then investigated. Participants' path preferences, time-varying sensitivity and learning behavior in the day-to-day process are also examined. The prediction power of various models with various settings (nonlinear effects, time-varying sensitivity, and learning) is compared. Assumption of rational behavior adjustment process in Yang and Zhang (2009) is further verified. Finally, evolutions of different Lyapunov functions used in the literature are plotted and no obvious diversity is observed.

show abstract

Section: Rational Behavior Adjustment Processmentioning

confidence: 76%

Exploration of day-to-day route choice models by a virtual experiment

Xiao

Yang

2018

Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Experimental studies reveal quick convergence to inefficient Nash equilibrium in this setting (84). One solution is the use of congestion pricing that builds on our understanding of human adaptation (85). Another solution is the design of attractive alternatives to driving.…”

Section: Potential Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Maximization, learning, and economic behavior

Erev

Roth

2014

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

138

102

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The rationality assumption that underlies mainstream economic theory has proved to be a useful approximation, despite the fact that systematic violations to its predictions can be found. That is, the assumption of rational behavior is useful in understanding the ways in which many successful economic institutions function, although it is also true that actual human behavior falls systematically short of perfect rationality. We consider a possible explanation of this apparent inconsistency, suggesting that mechanisms that rest on the rationality assumption are likely to be successful when they create an environment in which the behavior they try to facilitate leads to the best payoff for all agents on average, and most of the time. Review of basic learning research suggests that, under these conditions, people quickly learn to maximize expected return. This review also shows that there are many situations in which experience does not increase maximization. In many cases, experience leads people to underweight rare events. In addition, the current paper suggests that it is convenient to distinguish between two behavioral approaches to improve economic analyses. The first, and more conventional approach among behavioral economists and psychologists interested in judgment and decision making, highlights violations of the rational model and proposes descriptive models that capture these violations. The second approach studies human learning to clarify the conditions under which people quickly learn to maximize expected return. The current review highlights one set of conditions of this type and shows how the understanding of these conditions can facilitate market design.decisions from experience | mechanism design | contingencies of reinforcements | experience-description gap | reinforcement learning E conomics has long used idealized models of perfectly rational individual behavior as useful approximations for explaining market institutions and other economic phenomena. Many of the successful economic inventions (e.g., trading, commodity markets, auctions, matching market institutions) seem to work in ways that are well accounted for by rational models. For example, trading is most likely to be successful when all sides benefit from the trade. Careful empirical studies show, however, important violations of the rationality assumption (e.g., refs. 1-3). Thus, it seems that the usefulness of the leading economic analyses may be enhanced by relaxing the rationality assumption and improving the descriptive value of the underlying models, in part by identifying where the perfect-rationality approximations work more or less well and the purposes for which they may be more or less useful.Much of what has come to be called behavioral economics can be described as an attempt to make economic analyses more accurate by modifying the rational model to incorporate psychological insights. The most basic rational model, the expected value rule, models people as assigning cash equivalents to possible outcomes, and then selecting th...

show abstract

“…In Sandholm [30], we use this observation as the basis for an evolutionary approach to implementation theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets

Sandholm

2001

Journal of Economic Theory

Self Cite

362

317

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study potential games with continuous player sets, a class of games characterized by an externality symmetry condition.Examples of these games include random matching games with common payoffs and congestion games. We offer a simple description of equilibria which are locally stable under a broad class of evolutionary dynamics, and prove that behavior converges to Nash equilibrium from all initial conditions. W e consider a subclass of potential games in which evolution leads to efficient play. Finally, we show that the games studied here are the limits of convergent sequences of the finite player potential games studied by Monderer and Shapley [22].

show abstract

Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

Cited by 200 publications

References 34 publications

Exploration of day-to-day route choice models by a virtual experiment

Exploration of day-to-day route choice models by a virtual experiment

Maximization, learning, and economic behavior

Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About