The preemption problem

Johansson, Jens; Risberg, Olle

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-1019-x

Cited by 19 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Related to this is Parfit's (1987) non-identity problem, where the very harming event allows for the existence of the harmed person in the first place. 16 Two further problems are intractable for the counterfactual comparative account: (1) It entails that harm occurs in "failure-to-benefit" cases (Bradley 2012;Petersen 2014;Purves 2019;Shiffrin 1999Shiffrin , 2012, and (2) it is unable to deal with instances of overdetermination and pre-emption (Bradley 2012;Hanser 2008;Johansson and Risberg 2019;McMahan 2002;Norcross 2005;Petersen 2014;Shiffrin 2012). In failure-to-benefit cases, someone is harmed whenever he is not benefitted when he could have been.…”

Section: The Case For a Non-comparative Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

Villiers-Botha

2020

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In recent attempts to define “harm,” comparative accounts of harm, specifically counterfactual comparative accounts, have been touted as the most promising approaches to defining the concept. Nevertheless, such accounts face serious difficulties. This has led to the call for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call, arguing that non-comparative approaches to defining harm have not been sufficiently explored. I develop such an account and claim that it avoids the difficulties faced by comparative accounts while not presupposing a substantive theory of well-being, which is taken as a key failing of non-comparative accounts. I conclude that this definition renders a concept of harm that can be meaningfully employed in our moral discourse.

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Section: The Case For a Non-comparative Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

Villiers-Botha

2020

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“…19 Klocksiem (2012). 20 Johansson and Risberg (2017), convincingly argue that Klocksiem's proposal fails to solve the preemption problem. 21 Klocksiem (2012), p. 295 f. 22 See, e.g., the Archie and Jughead case (Klocksiem 2012, p. 289).…”

Section: Contextualism To the Rescue?mentioning

confidence: 99%

More Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit

Carlson

2018

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) has several virtues, but it also faces serious problems. I argue that CCA is incompatible with the prudential and moral relevance of harm and benefit. Some possible ways to revise or restrict CCA, in order to avoid this conclusion, are discussed and found wanting. Finally, I try to show that appealing to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals, or to the alleged contrastive nature of harm and benefit, does not provide a solution.

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“…Thanks for feedback to Josh DiPaolo, Nate Fulton, Gregory Glatz, Tino Petrocelli, Dan Rabinoff, Elena Rabinoff, Casey Woolwine, and some anonymous referees.2 For discussion of counterfactual accounts of harm, see e.g. [Boonin, 2014, 52-103],[Bradley, 2012],[Feinberg, 1984, 34],[Feit, 2015],[Feit, 2017],[Feldman, 1991],[Hanna, 2016],[Hanser, 2008],[Johansson and Risberg, 2019],[Klocksiem, 2012],[Norcross, 2005],[Northcott, 2015],[Purves, 2016],[Purves, 2019],[Rabenberg, 2015],[Roberts, 2007],[Thomson, 2011].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For discussion of it and similar cases, see e.g. [Boonin, 2014, 62],[Bradley, 2012, 407-8],[Feit, 2015, 363],[Hanser, 2008, 433-4],[Johansson and Risberg, 2019],[Klocksiem, 2012, 287],[Norcross, 2005, 165-6],[Northcott, 2015, 159],[Rabenberg, 2015, 10],[Roberts, 2007, 271],[Thomson, 2011, 446-7].…”

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confidence: 99%

The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm and the Preemption Problem

Immerman

2021

J. Moral Philos.

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Because harm is an important notion in ethics, it’s worth investigating what it amounts to. The counterfactual comparative account of harm, commonly thought to be the most promising account of harm, analyzes harm by comparing what actually happened with what would have happened in some counterfactual situation. But it faces the preemption problem, a problem so serious that it has driven some to suggest we abandon the counterfactual comparative account and maybe even abandon the notion of harm altogether. This paper defends a version of the counterfactual comparative account that solves the preemption problem, a version called the “worse than nothing account.” It says that you harm someone just in case you leave them worse off than if you’d done nothing at all.

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The preemption problem

Cited by 19 publications

References 7 publications

Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

More Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit

The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm and the Preemption Problem

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