The Powers and Mechanisms of the Passions

Hume on mental representation and intentionality

“…Second, we might read the Representation Argument as being restricted to some part or aspect of the passions, allowing that other parts or aspects of them have intentionality. For example, Lilli Alanen (, 193) takes Hume to accept the Dual‐Aspect View of perceptions. On her reading, his claim that passions involve no “reference to any other object” is restricted to their act‐aspects, considered apart from their object‐aspects (, 193–94).…”

“…For example, Lilli Alanen (, 193) takes Hume to accept the Dual‐Aspect View of perceptions. On her reading, his claim that passions involve no “reference to any other object” is restricted to their act‐aspects, considered apart from their object‐aspects (, 193–94). So, his Representation Argument allows that a passion has intentionality, when all its aspects are taken into account.…”

“…If Hume accepts the Object View of perceptions, as I have argued (§2), then this reading is untenable. Alanen also claims that passions are “complex” (, 186). This suggests another, similar reading that does not depend on the Dual‐Aspect View: perhaps the Representation Argument is restricted to a part of the passions, allowing that a passion as a whole involves “reference” to another object.…”

“…Ainslie (, 211–17) and Alanen (, 182–83 and 193) ascribe the Dual‐Aspect View to Hume. Broughton (, 43) may also mean to do so: she claims that perceptions are “conscious states” (perceivings?)…”