Hume's Indirect Passions

Cohon, Rachel

doi:10.1002/9780470696583.ch9

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…30 Hume's distinction between direct and indirect passions raises interesting issues that are beyond this essay's scope. For helpful discussions, see Cohon (2008a) and McIntyre (2000). 31 Hume writes that moral approbation and blame are "nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love and hatred" (T 3.3.5.1/614).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hume's distinction between direct and indirect passions raises interesting issues that are beyond this essay's scope. For helpful discussions, see Cohon () and McIntyre ().…”

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confidence: 99%

“…For versions of this approach, see Cohon () and (), Garrett (), Qu (), Schafer (), Schmidt (, Chapter 6), and Schmitter (). Although this is not her way of handling the Representation Argument, Alanen (, 124) distinguishes intentionality from representation, so this approach is open to her, as well.…”

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Hume on mental representation and intentionality

Cottrell

2018

Philosophy Compass

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The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, individually, peculiar to representational or intentional things. Second, Hume holds that the passions are not representational but do have intentionality extrinsically.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hume's distinction between direct and indirect passions raises interesting issues that are beyond this essay's scope. For helpful discussions, see Cohon () and McIntyre ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hume on mental representation and intentionality

Cottrell

2018

Philosophy Compass

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“…Vgl. für Näheres auch Cohon (2008a). 58 "Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others."…”

Section: Moral Aus Den Indirekten Affekten Reziprokmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gerechtigkeit bauen – Variationen mit Hume

Leist¹

2014

Deutsche Zeitschrift Für Philosophie

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Among philosophers and social scientists, Hume's idea of justice is generally identified with a system of rules based on mutual advantage, their moral quality playing either an insignificant or no part at all. This conventional or contractarian model, respectively, is not adequate to the special institution of morality or, in Hume, to the virtues, artificial or natural. It is not self-interest but sympathy in combination with the indirect passions of pride and humility that gives conventions their moral quality and social relevance. This article suggests exegetic and systematic reasons for the normative importance of Hume's moral psychology, which should open the way to a developing morality much more in agreement with actual Western societies than a static morality based on self-interest would allow.

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“…6. Cohon (2008) notes that Hume seems to equivocate between holding objects and the ideas of these objects as the intentional objects of the passions. I believe that, properly speaking, the intentional objects of the passions are the objects themselves rather than the ideas of them -Hume probably speaks loosely in speaking of ideas of objects as intentional objects, because we can only conceive of objects through our idea of them.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The simple duality: Humean passions

2012

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume's claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume's treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

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Hume's Indirect Passions

Cited by 6 publications

References 26 publications

Hume on mental representation and intentionality

Hume on mental representation and intentionality

Gerechtigkeit bauen – Variationen mit Hume

The simple duality: Humean passions

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