2016
DOI: 10.7249/rr1000
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The Power to Coerce: Countering Adversaries Without Going to War

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Cited by 13 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…However, if the great power's threats are not strongly supported and signaled, it may fail to coerce the weaker, as suggested by the compellence theory, particularly with U.S. interventions (Chamberlain, 2016). A great power may find a coercive strategy more effective and efficient when there are options in a coercion spectrum that can be bargained with the weaker (Haun, 2015;Gompert & Binnendijk, 2016). On the other hand, a weaker nation can also utilize this spectrum for achieving its targets without resorting to war.…”
Section: Asymmetric Relations Between Weaker Nations and Large Powers...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, if the great power's threats are not strongly supported and signaled, it may fail to coerce the weaker, as suggested by the compellence theory, particularly with U.S. interventions (Chamberlain, 2016). A great power may find a coercive strategy more effective and efficient when there are options in a coercion spectrum that can be bargained with the weaker (Haun, 2015;Gompert & Binnendijk, 2016). On the other hand, a weaker nation can also utilize this spectrum for achieving its targets without resorting to war.…”
Section: Asymmetric Relations Between Weaker Nations and Large Powers...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…En términos de discurso, Taş (2022) por su parte, establece una primera época en la que predominaría un discurso incluyente y demócrata conservador, homologable al de partidos cristiano-demócratas europeos, una segunda etapa, a partir de 2009, aproximadamente, que coincidiría con la llegada al ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Ahmet Davutoğlu en la que predominaría un discurso populista de tintes islámicos que glorificaría el pasado otomano, y una tercera etapa en la que predominaría un discurso nacionalista-populista en el que el pasado otomano serviría para reivindicar una posición defensiva ante Occidente, tendencia que comienza a desarrollarse tras las protestas de Gezi de 2013 y que se intensificará de marcada manera a partir de 2015.…”
Section: Las Etapas De La Política Exterior Del Akpunclassified
“…Este discurso de la diferencia experimentará un nuevo giro, muy especialmente, a partir de 2013, ya insertos en la tercera legislatura del partido gobernante (2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015) tras las manifestaciones de Gezi, que comenzaron como una pequeña movilización ecologista en el corazón de la ciudad de Estambul y se extendieron a toda Turquía como signo de protesta contra el gobierno de Erdoğan. De la europeización selectiva que se va a producir, de acuerdo a Atmaca y Torun (2022), entre los años 2005 y 2010, coincidiendo con la segunda legislatura del AKP, se dará paso a una progresiva deseuropeización seguida, a partir de 2013, por un marcado discurso anti-occidental (Kaliber y Kaliber 2019). De hecho, el primer ministro turco culpará directamente a elementos extranjeros de promover las revueltas de Gezi.…”
Section: Las Etapas De La Política Exterior Del Akpunclassified
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