The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters

Abstract

Power is the most important variable in world politics, but scholars and policy analysts systematically mismeasure it. Most studies evaluate countries’ power using broad indicators of economic and military resources, such as gross domestic product and military spending, that tally their wealth and military assets without deducting the costs they pay to police, protect, and serve their people. As a result, standard indicators exaggerate the wealth and military power of poor, populous countries, such as China and India. A sounder approach accounts for these costs by measuring power in net rather than gross terms. This approach predicts war and dispute outcomes involving great powers over the past 200 years more accurately than those that use gross indicators of power. In addition, it improves the in-sample goodness-of-fit in the majority of studies published in leading journals over the past five years. Applying this improved framework to the current balance of power suggests that the United States’ economic and military lead over other countries is much larger than typically assumed, and that the trends are mostly in America's favor.

Nature protection across countries: Do size and power matter?

“…Large to very large countries are also mostly affluent, populated and powerful (Figure 3), a conjunction of factors that make them fundamentally responsible for the conservation of nature. As a matter of fact, these countries manage a remarkable amount of natural resources and biodiversity, occupy different continents or hemispheres, possess the material resources to maintain and promote conservation programs, and shape and determine their own and others’ economic and political actions with the greatest independence (Neumann and Gstöhl 2004, Beckley 2018). Certainly, every country should make a similar attempt to conserve a fraction of their natural resources (SCBD 2010), as the fulfillment of common goals by small countries ensures the protection of their geographical or biological singularities.…”

“…In addition to this integration, conservation projects in smaller countries frequently obtain financial assistance from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Frank et al 2000, Kashwan 2017). This can eventually be associated with a green grabbing process (Fairhead et al 2012) or a sign of soft power (i.e., the ability to attract and co-opt others) that larger countries exert over smaller ones (Arvanitidis and Kollias 2016, Beckley 2018).…”

Uncertain population futures: Critical reflections on the IHME Scenarios of future fertility, mortality, migration and population trends from 2017 to 2100

“…The use of GDP as an indicator of the economic well-being of nations is increasingly being questioned, for example, by Ivković (2016) and Dynan and Sheiner (2018); and we are witnessing the retreat of 'GDP fetishism' as Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz 2009) refers to it. There are also many alternative perspectives on the primary determinant(s) of geopolitical power beyond GDP (Beckley 2018;Giblin 2013) and certainly population size (Coleman and Basten 2015). In other words, to assert the absolute predominance of certain regions and territories such as 'the Arab World' and 'Nigeria' based upon the conceptual link between working-age population size and economic performance -without considering the technical issues surrounding the production of such figures -is highly problematic.…”

“The persistent myth of lost hegemony,” revisited: structural power as a complex network phenomenon

“…What makes some countries more powerful than others? This is the most important question for the study and practice of international relations (Beckley, 2018a: 7).…”

“… 7. For example, Beckley (2018a) focuses on measurement of the power distribution, and finds that the United States’ relative capabilities have not declined nearly so much as naive measures based on national aggregates (such as GDP) might suggest. …”