The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary, 2003–2013

Abstract

The Taliban established their own judicial system in Afghanistan as both an instrument of population control and as a means to project themselves as an effective parallel government. Despite the heavy reliance on coercion, the Taliban’s method of dealing with common criminality and resolving disputes was often welcome, though the weak appeal system and the rapidity of the trials was sometimes criticized. A more structured approach to coercion, featuring rules, regulation and supervision over the military, allows less use of violence and promises increased predictability for the population, making active resistance less of a necessity. In the long run, the establishment of credible judiciary institutions reshapes the social environment and creates vested interests in favor of Taliban domination.

Rebel governance, rebel legitimacy, and external intervention: assessing three phases of Taliban rule in Afghanistan

“…68 The courts were initially indistinguishable from the military clout of the commanders, but throughout the 1980s, courts were established as separate institutions at various locations in Afghanistan and run by clerics of different mujahideen groups. 69 What would become the Taliban leadership already yielded a certain status of legitimacy due to these religious courts. Mullahs set up structures providing conflict mitigation; they would pass judgements and issue edicts and fatwas that were mainly concerned with issues arising among the civilian population or between different mujahideen groups/factions.…”

“…In addition to the military advances, the movement presented itself as an organization with a strict religious ideology and the ability to reestablish law and orderafter years of disunity among various mujahideen and the exhausting civil wars. 90 Though the movement was certainly unable to live up to all its promises, it created a level of order in the areas it controlled. The civilian population had grown tired of the continuing wars between military commanders, and no credible end was in sight.…”

“…143 The key development in governance has been the reestablishment and expansion of the Taliban's shadow judiciary. 144 By 2003, some of the Taliban courts had already re-emerged, though these were initially mainly reactive bodies that held sessions for specific events and issues. 145 If we consider Kunduz province, for instance, the Taliban judiciary was one of the main mechanisms that resolved judicial cases by 2018, but the exact figures are unknown.…”

“…Pragmatic forms of legitimacy Continuing its efforts from the IEA, the obvious area for the Taliban to rebuild its political legitimacy after 2001 was its judiciary. 156 It has used the judiciary to legitimize itself, condemning the corruption in the Afghan state and providing an alternative. Weigand indicates that the ability to resolve disputes is one of the main sources of legitimacy for the Taliban.…”

Legal Rule and Tribal Politics: The US Army and the Taliban in Afghanistan (2001–13)

“…In every district, a governor was nominated and was responsible to the Taliban governor of the province. The latter was then responsible to a committee in charge of eastern Afghanistan and to the executive body of the Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan (Giustozzi and Baczko, ). That such a hierarchized system remained functional despite the daily killings of cadres by the US Special Forces is suggestive of its degree of organization.…”