The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Latin America

Abstract

This chapter revisits the conventional wisdom about term limits in Latin America by bringing into perspective the inherent tradeoffs between electoral accountability and restrictions to incumbency advantage. While the changes in constitutional term limits that have occurred in recent decades have mostly been understood as attempts by incumbents to usurp power, this chapter suggests that a large number of these changes can instead be attributed to a process of constitutional adjustment. Movement towards less restrictive term limits need not be solely the result of dictatorial ambitions. The chapter presents the historical record, as well as a series of descriptive statistics which help shed light into this alternative view of changes to term limits over the years with evidence suggesting the increasing prevalence of a term limit regime that implies de facto longer terms for presidents, but conditional on voters’ approval.

The Democratic Cost of Consecutive Re-election and Presidential Term-Limit Evasion in Latin America

“…For some, the vertical accountability faced by non-term-limited presidents is of such a high importance for democratic governance that institutional reforms other than term limits should be sought instead (Cheibub and Medina 2019). Their aim should be to regulate the incumbency advantage rather than abolish it.…”

“…Their aim should be to regulate the incumbency advantage rather than abolish it. They include improvements to electoral accountability such as stricter regulation of campaign finance, fair distribution of public campaign funding, access to media and strengthening of agencies that oversee electoral campaigns (Cheibub and Medina 2019: 531). Our results put these recommendations into perspective.…”

“…After all, such a situation gives rise to candidacies of new and unknown politicians, and is unlikely to be rational, informed and independent (Linz 1998). Because term limits fundamentally interfere with the relationship between voters and presidents, they are considered a blunt instrument damaging to electoral accountability, so alternative institutional reforms that regulate the incumbency advantage should be sought instead (Cheibub and Medina 2019: 531).…”