The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States

Abstract

The phenomenon of failed states might be expected to lead to the development of mass-based social movements to address the typically ensuing social problems. This article explores the general failure of reformist insurgencies to develop in failed states, using analyses of Nigeria's Bakassi Boys and Oodua People's Congress, and references to other armed groups. The cause of this failure is found in the legacy of patronage politics, especially the strategies of rulers who monopolized economic opportunities as a way of controlling people. As centralized patronage networks fragment, popular movements develop to challenge this control. Local political entrepreneurs, however, continue to dominate local markets, including clandestine ones, and use this social domination to buy off members of mass movements. As their new patrons give them access to weapons and protection against rivals, the organizational position of members who pursue individual economic interests is enhanced, while the people with more overt ideological agendas are marginalized.

States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence

“…Despite the effect that pro-government militias can have on the political, economic, and social stability and security of civilians, with the notable exception of Ahram's (2011a) analysis of Janowitz's (1977) data, there is little quantitative research on these groups. This research lags behind the case study literature in analyzing the impact of these groups with, for example, studies of death squads in El Salvador (Stanley, 1996) and paramilitary groups elsewhere in Latin America (Centeno, 2002;Mazzei, 2009), the military's arming of political party organizations in Indonesia (Cribb, 2001: 233; see also Robinson's (1995: 228) discussion of 'semi-official armed gangs'), or the use of the Bakassi Boys by a state governor in Nigeria (Reno, 2002). 1 There are currently no systematic measures of these informal violent organizations that act on behalf of the government.…”

Patronage as Institutional Choice: Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda

“…Once they had decided their patrons were more a burden than a benefit, these clients could use the commercial networks and links they had formerly established to fund and launch insurgencies, as seen in the collapse of such regimes as Doe's Liberia, Barrie's Somalia and Mobutu's Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo; DRC), among others (Reno, 2002(Reno, , 2006. Indeed, as noted above, one of the more notable recent changes in African politics is the number of rebel leaders who have come to power since the mid-1980s.…”

“…While this strategy is politically safer for the government, its downside is that clients are free to develop independent sources of power in the countryside and, potentially, develop secessionist or rebel movements (Reno, 2002). Similarly, this strategy can prove dangerous where peripheral clients can develop local power alongside ties with neighboring states.…”

Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: What We Know, What We Need to Know

“…Second, the resource curse can corrode state institutions, with important implications for armed conflict. 'Unearned' resource rents that allow elites to buy security through corrupt patrimonial networks, rather than through the establishment of a 'social contract' based on the tax-financed provision of public goods and services, may in the long run undermine the regime's legitimacy and relative military, political, and economic strength, rendering it vulnerable to rebellion (Le Billon 2003; Addison and Murshed 2002;Moore 2000;Reno 2000: 43-8;Reno 2002). The weaker the state, such as in Sierra Leone, Nepal, and Zaire/DRC, the more feasible becomes rebellion-whether to reform the kleptocratic patrimonial system or simply to grab a slice of the pie.…”