Patronage as Institutional Choice: Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda

Abstract

Abstract:An increasingly large literature on patronage and clientelism has developed within political science in recent years. Yet this body of scholarship has heretofore failed to develop theories that explain variation in patronage allocation across countries. Here I develop such a theory based on the logic of institutional choice, whereby political leaders allocate patronage in accordance with the political threats they face. Specifically, I argue that patronage allocation can be explained by varying political geographies and time horizons. I test this theory through a comparative case study of Rwanda and Uganda, whose current regimes are remarkably similar in origin and structure. I also extend my analysis to previous regimes in both countries, including the analysis of counterfactual or off-path behavior. In all cases I find strong support for the theory. Organisation pour la démocratie populaire -mouvement du travail (ODP-MT)(Organization for Popular Democracy -Labour Movement)Name of ruling party in Burkina Faso, 1989-1996 Office de distribution du pain; mange et tais-toi (Office for Bread Distribution -Eat and Shut Up) Popular wordplay on ODP-MT (Harsch, 1998, pp. 636-637)

Planning and development regulation amid rapid urban growth: Explaining divergent trajectories in Africa

“…Uganda and Rwanda are similar in terms of their economies (largely agricultural, with little manufacturing industry), levels of poverty and economic growth, population densities, rates of urban growth and levels of urbanisation. 4 The political regimes in place also have a shared background: the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda literally formed inside the Ugandan National Resistance Movement (NRM), and both came to power through protracted guerrilla struggle after devastating periods of civil conflict (Green, 2011;Waugh, 2004). 5 The cities themselves, too, are similar: Kampala is certainly larger, but by 2010 both were cities of around 1-2 million inhabitants located in infrastructurally-challenging terrain of hills and swamps, sharing tropical climates and having little by way of formal employment.…”

“…55 Moreover, one resource the government does have to draw on is its reputation for clamping down on corruption (Desrosiers and Thomson, 2011). While there are certainly forms of patronage and patrimonialism in Rwanda (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012;Green, 2011), the point is that the highly visible forms of corruption associated with waiving formal planning rules for elites in exchange for favours would be politically dangerous in Kigali. The importance of the discourse of anti-corruption as a political resource is evident in the attitudes of both high-level politicians and lowly state functionaries towards urban development regulations.…”

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

“…It has been seen as the 'core feature of politics in Africa' (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, p. 3). Although some have seen patrimonialism as an intrinsic cultural trait (Bayart, 1993;Chabal and Daloz, 1999), others argue that it is an institutional choice (Green, 2011) and a key tool of elite management and ruler stabilization .…”

Demystifying the Role of Chinese Commercial Actors in the Shaping China’s Foreign Assistance: The Case of Post-war Sri Lanka

“…However, such intentions may not be based on a solid understanding of the political economy of host countries. In fact, research has shown that officials in host countries systematically favor their home constituencies (Barkan & Chege 1989;Moser 2008;Horowitz & Palaniswamy 2010;Burgess et al 2011;Green 2011;Do et al 2013). Quantitative analysis suggests that China's assistance projects are vulnerable to regional favoritism while qualitative assessments have pointed out that projects can be easily exploited for political gain (Dreher et al 2014;Brautigam 2009;MthembuSalter 2012;Jansson 2013).…”