The politics of growth models

Abstract

This article develops a framework for studying the politics of growth models. These, the authors posit, are sustained by ‘growth coalitions’ based in key sectors. Their members are first and foremost firms and employer associations, but fractions of labor are also included, if their interests do not impair the model’s functionality. There is no guarantee that a growth coalition and a winning electoral coalition coincide. In normal times, a growth coalition effectively insulates itself from political competition, and mainstream political parties converge on key growth model policies. In moments of crisis, however, the coalition shrinks, favoring the emergence of challengers that fundamentally contest the status quo. The way governing parties respond to electoral pressures can also play an important role in the recalibration of growth models. The authors illustrate the argument by examining the politics of ‘export-led growth’ in Germany, ‘construction-led growth’ in Spain, and ‘balanced growth’ in Sweden.

From integrated to fragmented elites. The core of Swiss elite networks 1910–2015

“…Two lines of inquiry, both inspired by neo‐gramscian perspectives, seem particularly promising. First, exploring to what extent elite networks mirror social blocs behind particular growth models in the perspective outlined by Baccaro and Pontusson ( 2019 ) could help us understand the economic underpinnings of elite networks. Second, exploring if and how different elite network constellations draw on development of hegemonic projects (Jessop, 2016 ) could aid our explorations of how the ideological foundation of a changing elite is maintained.…”

Public sector employment relations: Germany in comparative perspective

“…Due to cross-country variations, there are more national growth regimes and not only two as in the binary distinction of 'consumption-led' versus 'export-led' ones. Therefore, some authors distinguish more (five) ideal-typical growth regimes in (more) contemporary advanced economies (Hassel et al, 2020;Baccaro and Hadziabdic, 2022). 5 Their linkage of welfare states and growth regimes differentiates more clearly these modes of governance but does not include a sectoral analysis and a thorough analysis remains excluded.…”

“…Growth models clearly focus on private industry and try to describe and analyze national differences and their consequences for growth. They do not deal with (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2022) – or do not even mention the ps (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016; Baccaro and Howell, 2017). In other words, the ps is beyond their range of interest.…”

The Political Economic Sources of Policy Non-design, Policy Accumulation, and Decay in Policy Capacity

“…. that can legitimately claim to represent the ‘national interest’]” (Baccaro & Pontusson, 2016, p. 200; Baccaro & Pontusson, 2022); policy ideas relate to actors’ policy preferences that reflect their ontological approaches to policy problems and solutions. Institutional arrangements regulate the interactions between actors within the growth regime (e.g., bureaucratic autonomy, clientelistic relations between the incumbent and business).…”

“…Still, we do not know much about the political economic drivers of policy (non-) design and instrument choice, even if there have been calls for linking public policy scholarship with comparative political economy scholarship (John, 2018). In a similar vein, the emerging growth models and regimes strand in comparative political economy scholarship points to the need for studies that would examine how “economic developments shape political interests and how do these interests feed into policy making” (Stockhammer & Kohler, 2022, p. 15; Baccaro & Pontusson, 2016, 2022; Hassel & Palier, 2021).…”