The Politicisation of EC Anti-dumping Policy: Member States, Their Votes and the European Commission

Evenett, Simon J.; Vermulst, Edwin

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00701.x

Cited by 45 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 9 publications

(3 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As EU member state principals' preferences on individual cases of antidumping decisions co-vary with the dominant preference within their own territory, geographical concentration has made some member states indifferent or even opposed to imposing anti-dumping duties on particular products for which they no longer have production facilities (Evenett and Vermulst 2005). The absence of industry support for the imposition of duties in individual anti-dumping cases in countries without production can thus account for a member state principal voting against the agents' proposal in an individual anti-dumping case.…”

Section: Concentrated Producer Interests Industry Consolidation and mentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups and EU anti-dumping policy

Bièvre¹,

Eckhardt²

2011

Journal of European Public Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Why did the European Union (EU) attempt yet fail to reform its anti-dumping legislation between 2006 and 2008? We analyse this attempt to reform a legislative act regulating interest groups' access to public decision-makers by relying on collective action and principal -agent theory. Contrary to approaches assuming that the European Commission enjoys a large degree of agent autonomy to implement a more liberal EU trade policy than most member state principals would want, we conceive of principals and their agents as actors responding to the relative balance between interest groups mobilizing for and against reform. Tracing interest group collective action advantages back to industry consolidation and the certainty of future losses, we argue that concentrated producer groups mobilize most intensively and persistently and successfully influence policy outcomes. On the losing side, importers and retailers, joined by producers having outsourced parts of their production, let alone consumers, fail to counter this mobilization effort.

show abstract

Section: Concentrated Producer Interests Industry Consolidation and mentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups and EU anti-dumping policy

Bièvre¹,

Eckhardt²

2011

Journal of European Public Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…6 As a result, import-dependent firms are often very uncertain if, when and to what extent political action will pay off (Evenett and Vermulst, 2005).…”

Section: The Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Council has the final say in anti-dumping cases and, as abstentions are considered to be votes in favour of a duty, it is relatively easy to get a (simple) majority of Member States behind the imposition of duties. 6 As a result, import-dependent firms are often very uncertain if, when and to what extent political action will pay off (Evenett and Vermulst, 2005).…”

Section: The Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

EUUnilateral Trade Policy‐Making: What Role for Import‐Dependent Firms?

Eckhardt

2013

J of Common Market Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article looks at political mobilization and the influence of import-dependent firms in the context of the European Union's (EU) trade defence instrument (TDI) policy. By looking at this increasingly relevant set of economic actors during (unilateral) TDI decision-making, the article provides a much needed complement to the existing EU trade policy literature, which is dominated by analyses of the trade policy preferences and involvement of import-competing and exportdependent firms during multilateral and bilateral trade co-operation. The article defines importdependent firms and theorizes the circumstances under which they are capable of lobbying and of wielding influence in EU TDI cases. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from a series of recent EU TDI episodes.

show abstract

“…After a peak in 1999, the number of EU antidumping investigations dramatically decreased to seven cases in 2003, three of which targeting East Asia. There is no a reliable explanation for the recent drop in the EU antidumping actions although Evenett and Vermulst (2005) argue that it may be an outcome of the politicization of the EU antidumping procedure [7]. Figure 5 shows the EU antidumping investigations targeted by product category and 170 out of 394 antidumping investigations in the period 1991-2003 were targeting different products [8].…”

Section: Trends Of Antidumping Actions Targeting East Asiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of EU antidumping actions against East Asian countries

Zhou

Cuyvers

2009

Journal of International Trade Law and Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. AbstractPurpose -The purpose of this paper is to investigate the trends of antidumping actions targeting East Asia and to examine the macroeconomic determinants of European Union (EU) antidumping actions against East Asian countries including China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Design/methodology/approach -A Negative Binomial Regression approach is used to estimate the macroeconomic determinants (exchange rates, gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and unemployment rates) of EU antidumping actions against East Asian countries. Findings -The empirical estimation results suggest that the macroeconomic determinants (exchange rates, GDP growth, and unemployment rates) significantly affect antidumping initiations against a particular country in a particular year; in addition, the changing competitive structure and environment in international trade play a role in prompting antidumping actions, and the countries which are larger sources of EU imports are more likely to be hit with antidumping actions. Originality/value -This is the first paper to examine the macroeconomic determinants of EU antidumping actions targeting East Asian countries and the empirical estimation results provide strong evidence. It also finds that the changing competitive structure and environment in international trade prompt antidumping actions.

show abstract

The Politicisation of EC Anti-dumping Policy: Member States, Their Votes and the European Commission

Cited by 45 publications

References 9 publications

Interest groups and EU anti-dumping policy

Interest groups and EU anti-dumping policy

EUUnilateral Trade Policy‐Making: What Role for Import‐Dependent Firms?

Determinants of EU antidumping actions against East Asian countries

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About