Interest groups and EU anti-dumping policy

Bièvre, Dirk De; Eckhardt, Jappe

doi:10.1080/13501763.2011.551068

Cited by 36 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(24 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The review of the sampled articles reveals that interest group access is widely studied in the United States (Andrews and Edwards, 2004;Ansolabehere et al, 2002;Austen-Smith, 1998;Cohen, 1970) and Europe (Beyers and Kerremans, 2012;Bouwen, 2004b;Braun, 2013;Buksti, 1980;De Bievre and Eckhardt, 2011), and increasingly also in other developed countries such as Israel (Yishai, 1998) and Japan (Tsujinaka and Pekkanen, 2007).…”

Section: Access In the Study Of Interest Group Influencementioning

confidence: 97%

what is access? a discussion of the definition and measurement of interest group access

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Interest group research has focused extensively on political access. While access does not guarantee influence, it is customarily seen as a crucial step towards gaining political influence. It is argued that groups with access are, all else equal, more likely to be influential than groups without access. Biased access may thus result in biased influence. On the basis of a review of this literature, the article shows how the concept of access rests on an intuitive understanding rather than an explicit definition. This hampers methodological discussions of measurement. We propose to define access as instances where a group has entered a political arena (parliament, administration, or media) passing a threshold controlled by relevant gatekeepers (politicians, civil servants, or journalists). On the basis of this discussion, we compare operationalisations based on our proposed definition with some of the major alternatives found in the literature.

show abstract

Section: Access In the Study Of Interest Group Influencementioning

confidence: 97%

what is access? a discussion of the definition and measurement of interest group access

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…They found that agent autonomy increases with heterogeneity among principals. In EU foreign policies, Council unity is a similarly central factor for explaining Commission discretion (Conceição-Heldt 2011;De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011;Elgström and Larsén 2010;niemann and Huigens 2011). Therefore, principal-agent scholars widely share the view that conflict among (collective or multiple) principals results in increased agent leeway.…”

Section: Theoretical Puzzle: Contestation In Collective Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Contestation Within a Collective Agent in EU Trade Policy-Making

Gastinger

2017

The Principal Agent Model and the European Union

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…In the context of antidumping policy, groups of firms file complaints alleging dumping of a specific product, upon which public authorities have to act by carrying out an investigation and/or imposing antidumping duties on that product (Finger 1991;De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011).…”

Section: Direct Incentives For Collective Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

WTO Judicial Politics and EU Trade Policy: Business Associations as Vessels of Special Interest?

Poletti¹,

Bièvre²,

Hanegraaff³

2015

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article: • Contributes to the literature on interest groups showing how the interplay of domestic and international institutional structures critically affects the character of lobbying. • Contributes to a better understanding of EU trade politics, highlighting how such processes are systematically affected by changes in global governance structures. • Traces empirically how important institutional innovations were introduced in EU trade policy making in order to adapt to reform of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. • Offers systematic empirical evidence about the evolution of the character of dispute settlement cases initiated by the EU in the WTO. • Shows empirically how business associations traditionally active in EU trade policy making increasingly act as 'vessels' of narrow and specialized interests. This article focuses on the effects of the WTO's quasi-judicial system of dispute resolution on the politics of trade policy making in the European Union (EU). We argue that this institutional innovation had a systematic transformative effect on EU trade politics, creating pressures for institutional adaptation and changing the character of organized trade policy lobbying. On the one hand, the new environment of the WTO created pressures for the EU to implement significant institutional innovations to ease access for private parties and generate an influx of information to strengthen offensive market access actions. On the other hand, this reform directly affected firms' incentives to mobilize politically, creating incentives for specialized lobbying. The empirical analysis shows how these two processes ultimately led to a re-organization of trade policy lobbying in the EU and compelled European business associations to become increasingly receptive to the demands of special interests.

show abstract

Interest groups and EU anti-dumping policy

Cited by 36 publications

References 25 publications

what is access? a discussion of the definition and measurement of interest group access

what is access? a discussion of the definition and measurement of interest group access

Effects of Contestation Within a Collective Agent in EU Trade Policy-Making

WTO Judicial Politics and EU Trade Policy: Business Associations as Vessels of Special Interest?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About