The political economy of labor market regulation by the European Union

Abstract

Labor regulation, European Union, Regulatory competition, F36, F42, F59, J80,

Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly

“…4 In the European Union (EU), ideological differences between national governments appear to have mixed influences on EU politics. Vaubel (2008) analyzes the political economy of labor market deregulation by the EU and also considers potential impacts of government ideology. His case-study evidence suggests that labor market deregulation in the EU did not appear to be related to government ideology.…”

Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries

“…See alsoVaubel (2008) for a survey of the political economy of labor market deregulation by the European Union.…”

There is life after the Commission: An empirical analysis of private interest representation by former EU-commissioners, 1981–2009

“…Moreover, the Social Agreement of Maastricht established qualified majority voting for several types of labor market regulation. More than 50 labor regulations have been adopted since 1989 (for a list see Vaubel 2008, Comparing the seven Commissions under analysis, we find that the share of private interest representatives is close to 50% for the Thorn, Delors II, Delors III and Santer Commissions but close to 25% for the Delors I, Prodi and Barroso I Commissions. The increase from the Delors I Commission to the Delors II Commission (1989-93) may have been due to the introduction of qualified majority regulation in 1987, and the drop from the Santer Commission to the Prodi Commission (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004) may have been caused by the Code of Conduct of 1999.…”