2010
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1641022
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Punishment Goals: Legal Implications of Outcome-Driven Reasoning

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1

Citation Types

0
2
0

Year Published

2014
2014
2016
2016

Publication Types

Select...
2

Relationship

0
2

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
2
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Of importance, perceived harm is unlikely to be the product of effort ful rationalization, as revealed by the time pressure manipulation (Study 1), implicit social cognition studies (Studies 2 and 3), unrelated judgments of injuries (Study 4), and perceptions of children's suffering (Study 5). Of course, effortful rationalizations exist and often do focus upon issues of harm (Haidt & Hersh, 2001;Sood & Darley, 2007), but we suggest that these justifica tions build off of initial and automatic perceptions. Analogously, moral judgments can also involve explicit reasoning (Mercier, 2011;Mercier & Sperber, 2011;Pizarro & Bloom, 2003), but this does not rule out the importance-or psychological persis tence-of intuitive perceptions of right or wrong.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…Of importance, perceived harm is unlikely to be the product of effort ful rationalization, as revealed by the time pressure manipulation (Study 1), implicit social cognition studies (Studies 2 and 3), unrelated judgments of injuries (Study 4), and perceptions of children's suffering (Study 5). Of course, effortful rationalizations exist and often do focus upon issues of harm (Haidt & Hersh, 2001;Sood & Darley, 2007), but we suggest that these justifica tions build off of initial and automatic perceptions. Analogously, moral judgments can also involve explicit reasoning (Mercier, 2011;Mercier & Sperber, 2011;Pizarro & Bloom, 2003), but this does not rule out the importance-or psychological persis tence-of intuitive perceptions of right or wrong.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…These perceptions of harm are not just post hoc rhetoric, as people see suffering in the faces of children milliseconds after being primed with ostensibly harmless moral violations (e.g., masturbation; Gray et al, 2014). Certainly people can reason about harm after the fact, and do use the rhetoric of harm to convince others (Kahan, 2007; Sood & Darley, 2007), but this deliberative reasoning likely stems from intuitive and automatic perceptions of harm (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). At the very least, it is a logical fallacy to conclude that, because perceptions of harm can be used in reasoning, all harm is necessarily reasoned.…”
Section: Dyadic Moralitymentioning
confidence: 99%