2014
DOI: 10.1037/a0036149
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The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.

Abstract: When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have … Show more

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Cited by 235 publications
(312 citation statements)
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References 167 publications
(203 reference statements)
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“…Some authors have argued that moral dumbfounding does not really exist (Gray et al, 2014;Jacoby, 1983; see also Royzman et al, 2015;Sneddon, 2007;Wielenberg, 2014). 3 The studies described in the present paper aim to replicate the initial interview study of Haidt et al (2000), and to explore practicable methods for testing the phenomenon, and its variability, in larger sample sizes.…”
Section: (The Short) History Of Moral Dumbfoundingmentioning
confidence: 72%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Some authors have argued that moral dumbfounding does not really exist (Gray et al, 2014;Jacoby, 1983; see also Royzman et al, 2015;Sneddon, 2007;Wielenberg, 2014). 3 The studies described in the present paper aim to replicate the initial interview study of Haidt et al (2000), and to explore practicable methods for testing the phenomenon, and its variability, in larger sample sizes.…”
Section: (The Short) History Of Moral Dumbfoundingmentioning
confidence: 72%
“…In recent years moral dumbfounding has been challenged by a number of authors (e.g., Gray et al, 2014;Jacobson, 2012;Sneddon, 2007;Wielenberg, 2014), arguing, in line with rationalist theories of moral judgement (Kohlberg, 1971;Narvaez, 2005;Topolski, Weaver, Martin, & McCoy, 2013), that moral judgements are grounded in reasons. Recent work by Royzman, Kim, and Leeman (2015), involving a series of studies focusing on the Incest dilemma, identified two reasons that may be guiding participants' judgements.…”
Section: Challenges To Moral Dumbfoundingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This evidence suggests that "moral" judgments cannot be described as universally and particularly characterized by the perception of harm and suffering (as suggested by Gray et al, 2014), and is more congruent with an interpretation of moral judgments' focal concerns being plural, and shifting as guided by culture (Graham et al, 2013). It is consistent with a description of Chinese morality as primarily a form of virtue ethics, in which immoral behaviors are those that show one's character to be insufficiently polished; criminal behaviors, on the other hand, are too extreme to be relevant to virtue (Bakken, 2000;A.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is substantial evidence highlighting the role that aversion to harm plays in moral judgments (Blair, 1995;Cushman et al, 2012;Crockett, 2013;Schein and Ward, 2014). Such harm aversion can arise either from thinking about the outcome caused by a specific action-not pushing the person on the tracks which will cause five people to die-or by the action itself-pushing a person on the tracks (Crockett, 2013;Cushman, 2013).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%