The Place of Self‐Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy*

Abstract

I. THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL REFORMULATEDD ELIBERATIVE democracy has traditionally been defined in opposition to self-interest, to bargaining and negotiation, to voting, and to the use of power. Our assessment differs in two ways from the traditional one. First, we contend that self-interest, suitably constrained, ought to be part of the deliberation that eventuates in a democratic decision. Indeed, some forms of negotiation involving self-interest meet all of our criteria for ideal deliberation, in particular the criterion that in their ideal form deliberative methods eschew coercive power. We thus include such constrained self-interest and these forms of negotiation in our reformulation of the deliberative ideal, that is, the regulative standard to which real deliberations should aspire. Second, we argue for a complementary rather than antagonistic relation of deliberation to many democratic mechanisms that are not themselves deliberative. These nondeliberative mechanisms, such as aggregation through voting as well as fair bargaining and negotiation among cooperative antagonists, involve coercive power in their mechanisms of decision. Yet they can and must be justified deliberatively. Our ideal polity is diverse and plural. Its members both strive for

Does Enclave Deliberation Polarize Opinions?

“…Along with rational argumentation, these definitions include other forms of communication such as rhetoric and narratives (see e.g. Mansbridge et al 2010). Despite these developments, the idea of public reasoning among free and equal individuals remains in the core of the concept of democratic deliberation.…”

Mini-publics et démocratie délibérative

“…Il faudrait plutôt la concevoir comme un ensemble de processus collectifs publics de mise à l'épreuve de la validité des opinions et de la justesse des choix de chacun des acteurs concernés, y compris des citoyens qui semblent les moins mobilisés et les moins intéressés. C'est cette vision élargie, et surtout « non conversationnelle », de la délibération qui semble aujourd'hui davantage promue par certains tenants de la théorie délibérative (voir notamment Mansbridge et al, 2010).…”

Deliberative democracy and the problem of tacit knowledge

“…16 These are approaches which see impersonal forms of reasoning as the only legitimate factors in persuasion and include the work of Habermas and his followers. These accounts of deliberative democracy have been criticized from a number of fronts, such as their inability to account for emotions, self-interest and compromise (Mansbridge et al, 2010). This section will argue that by confining deliberation to impersonal reason, these approaches will also fail to incorporate tacit forms of knowledge through trust in testimony.…”